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ABSTRACT
For 1976, Japan harvested more fish than any other nation,
but was closely seconded by the Soviet Union. Both countries
needed ocean regimes that would secure wide exclusive fishery
zones off their coasts and guarantee their traditional fish-
ery rights within the same zones off the coasts of other coun-
tries. The current negotiations between Japan and the Soviet
Union on the amount of catch by Japanese within the Soviet
Union's 200-mile zone and by the Soviet Union within the
Japanese 200-mile zone are very complex. They involve terri-
torial questions over four islands (Etorofu, Kunashiri~
Shikotan, and the Habomai group) northeast of Hokkaido, Japan,
which have been occupied by the Soviet Union since the end of
World War II. When the Soviets declared their 200-mile zone,
Japan did not agree to Soviet fishing jurisdiction over the
200-mile zone surrounding these islands. In order to secure
its traditional interests in fishing within the extensive
200-mile lines, including the disputed islands, Japan had to
agree to the Soviet lines with a proviso that territorial
questions would be separated from fishing rights. This
thesis examines the recent history of the Japanese-Soviet
fishery negotiations, with particular reference to territorial
disputes as well as the influence of foreign policy issues
and future problems are discussed.
ii
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1I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1970s, the nations participating in the Third
Law of the Sea Conference started to claim 200-mile exclu-
sive economic zones, which became a main subject of the
debate in international ocean law. Meanwhile in 1976, the
United States unilaterally proclaimed a 200-mile fishery
zone (effective as of March 1, 1977) to regulate and control
the traditional fishing grounds off the coasts of the United
States. Then, the European Economic Community (E.E.C.) de-
clared the establishment of their 200-mile exclusive eco-
nomic zone, following the example of the U.S. 200-mile fish-
ery zone. The Soviet Union harvested about 4.6 million
metric tons of fish in the North Atlantic Ocean in 1975.
Exclusion of the Soviet fishing fleets from the E.E.C. and
the U.S. zones was a major blow to Soviet fishing efforts.
Thus the Soviet Union found it necessary to offset its de-
crease in fish catch from western European and the United
States coastal waters by increasing its efforts in the north-
western Pacific Ocean. Under these circumstances, the
Soviet Union established a 200-mile fishery zone in December
1976. The Japanese fishery harvested 1.;39 million metric
tons in the area of the Soviet 200-mile zone in 1975, and
thus was badly hurt by unforeseen implications of the Soviet
2200-mile zone. The Japanese tried and failed to guarantee
fishing rights within the Soviet 200-mile zone' traditionally
fished by Japan. Because of these different ocean policies
evolving in the Soviet Union and Japan, a need for fisheries
negotiations between two countries developed. However,
these were complicated by the unsettled problems of the
Soviets occupied islands to the north of Japan which are
claimed by both countries. The territorial issues and fish-
ing negotiations have tended to become inextricably mixed
and have greatly politicized Japan's limited fishing activi-
ties in the Soviet Union's 200-mile zone.
3II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE NORTHERN FISHERY
The MacArthur Line
At the beginning of World War II, the Japanese distant-
water fishery, which already extended to the Sea of Okhotsk
and Bering Sea for salmon and crab fishing, to the South China
Sea and South Pacific Ocean for tuna and skipjack fishing,
and to the Antarctic Ocean for whale fishing, was the largest
harvester of fishes in the world. The Japanese distant-water
fishery rapidly grew with the strengthening of armaments in
Japan, and was conceived as military threat by many countries,
since warships often accompanied the fishing fleets as pro-
tection from local fishermen of other countries. During
World War II its fishery suffered a deadly blow, and collapsed
on September 27, 1945 with the establishment of the so-called
"MacArthur Line"l by the General Headquarters of the Allied
Powers occupying Japan, in which all fishing activities were
limited by reference to fishing season, fishing gear type,
species, and area which was not to extend beyond 12 miles
from Japan's coast. As a result, the Northern Pacific fishery
which had been built up by the Japanese fishermen for 70
years (since 1875)2 in the North Kuril Island areas and for
40 years (since 1905)3 in the Kamchatka areas was put to an
end (see Fig.l).
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Figure 1. The MacArhur Line in 1945.
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5The MacArthur Line was established by Allied Powers
occupation force as one anti-militarism policy of Japan be-
cause the large fishing vessels had the possibility of being
easily transformed to military use. Additionally, it was in-
tended to reduce the menace of the Japanese distant water
fishery which had already been perceived as a threat to the
coastal fisheries of other nations. 4 The General Headquarters
of the Allied Powers did recognize that in Japan's present
situation, it was necessary for the Japanese to increase
their food supply from the oceans because of a food crisis
developing in Japan after World War II. Therefore, the
Japanese distant-water fishery was soon allowed to operate
under a new policy. The General Headquarters of the Allied
Powers extended "The MacArthur Line" by several successive
steps, such as in November 1945 allowing whale fishing near
Ogasawara Islands and later (1948) in the Antarctic Ocean. 5
At this point, only the Northern Pacific fishery was placed
under restrictions, which remained in effect until the restor-
ation of its sovereignty on April 28, 1952, when the San
Francisco Peace Treaty came into force. At this time "The
MacArthur Line" was abolished, and the Japanese Northern
pacific fishery once again started its operation on the high
seas in the North Pacific Ocean. However, the United States
and Canada were afraid of the Japanese Fishery's potential
for growth and competition in the Northeastern Pacific Ocean,
hence they restrained it under claims of coastal states
preference and ocean resources protection.
6The United States and Canada agreed to negotiate the Peace
Treaty with Japan only under the condition that the Japanese
fishery growth be controlled by the North Pacific Fishery
Convention. 6 Article 9 of the Peace Treaty placed Japan
under the obligation to negotiate with the Allied Powers,
so Japan was pressured, and had no other choice but to con-
clude bilateral and multilateral agreements for the regula-
tion or limitation of fishing, and the conservation and de-
velopment of fisheries on the high seas. In November 1951,
the North Pacific Fishery Convention was held in Tokyo, and
Japan agreed to negotiate with the United States and Canada,
which resulted in its reluctant acceptance of the so-called
principle of abstention (no Japanese Salmon and Herring
fishery east of Longitude l750W) (see Fig. 2).
The Resumption of Japanese Northern Pacific Fishery
Under these circumstances, the Japanese Northern Pacific
Fishery resumed operation, but the Japanese government was
afraid to let them operate in the western side of the Pacific
high seas beyond Longitude l700E (near Kamchatka) without a
treaty with the Soviet Union (see Fig. 3). Even though this
area was well beyond the Soviet territorial limits, Japan
felt there was great potential for conflict and used con-
siderable restraint in their fishing activities, especially
since the Soviet Union refused to sign the San Francisco
Peace Treaty. As a consequence, the Japanese government de-
cided that the Japanese fishery could operate on the high
seas near the Aleutian Islands area far from Kamchatka.
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9Still, the Japanese fishery did not have the necessary high
seas experience for effective operation, and therefore the
industry sUffered.
However, three fleets made up of 50 fishing boats had
a good catch in that new area in May 1952, and moved to the
west on Latitude SooN. It should be noted that Japanese fish-
ery policy is governed primarily through a licensing system
of not only the coastal fishery but also large-scale fishery
operations in the high seas. Therefore, essentially all fish-
ing activities have been regulated directly by the Japanese
government. As the fishing fleets began operating near Longi-
tude l70 0E at the end of June 1952, the fisheries industry
demanded that the Japanese government extend the fishing zone
further West. On July 4, 1952, the Japanese government
limited its advance to 70-100 miles offshore from the Kuril
Islands and Kamchatka because of its concern over possible
conflict with the Soviets. Consequently, the harvest of
fishes was rapidly increased, and total harvest of salmon
was 3851 metric tons in 1952. 7
Before World War II, the Japanese salmon mother fishery
operated in the Soviet coastal water not more than 5 miles
from both sides of Kamchatka coasts. However, Japan's
major fishing areas after World War II were the high seas
centering around the Aleutian Islands.
The following year, in 1953, the fishing industry de-
manded 8 fleets for the Northern Pacific salmon fishery, but
10
the Japanese government already made a decision for 3 fleets
of 85 fishing vessels and 15 research ships. But, the gross
tonnage of the 3 fleets was increased three times more than
the last year, because the new mother ships were constructed
for each fleet. Also, their advance was permitted up to 40
miles from Kamchatka. As a consequence, total harvest in-
creased from 3851 metric tons (the previous year's harvest)
to 14,681 metric tons. Additionally in this year, 191 li-
censed drift gillnet fishing boats (more than 30 gross tons)
were authorized for minor (small scale) salmon fishing in
offshore areas near Northern Hokkaido.
In 1954, minor salmon fishing dramatically increased
to 1897 boats due to high profits. 8 Thus the salmon drift
gillnet fishery association petitioned for the extension of
permissible fishing areas beyond Latitude 47°N to the North.
Though the Japanese government rejected the proposal because
this was the authorized zone for the mother ship type (large
scale) fishery, it became somewhat of a political embarrass-
ment that the government protected the large scale fishery
enterprises at the expense of the minor fishermen. As a re-
sult, the Japanese government authorized the operation of
the minor salmon fishing to southern areas at Latitude 48°N
and restricted the mother ship type fishing to northern areas
at Latitude 48°30'N from 1955.
The North Pacific salmon mother ship type of fishery9
was successful with two test salmon fishing operations, so
that by the third year of operation, the procedure became
11
standardized, utilizing 7 fleets of 160 fishing vessels in
1954. The fishery industry requested the Japanese government
for 21 fleets of 606 fishing vessels and 117 research ships
for the fourth fishing operation in 1955. The Japanese
government announced that only 12 mother ships and 280 fish-
ing vessels would be allowed for the regular operation in
Aleutian waters and 2 mother ships and 50 fishing vessels
for test operation in the Sea of Okhotsk. l O Consequently,
some trouble began when one fishery industry, which was not
authorized for the North Pacific salmon fishery, tried to
operate under a flag convenience as a British fishing vessel.
However, the Japanese government prohibited it. l l The Japa-
nese Fishery Agency encouraged that the coastal water fishery
in Japan be transposed to salmon fishing (of the mother type
of fishery) in the North Pacific Ocean and the Sea of
Okhotsk. During the operation of "the MacArthur Line," the
Japanese coastal zone was teeming with large scale enterprises
and minor fisheries, which caused many conflicts in all areas
of the Japanese ocean. And it became a major object of public
concern in Japah. Therefore, the Fishery Policy of the
Japanese government diverted much of the fishing boats and
surplus fishermen to offshore fishing or distant water fish-
ing. The Japanese government aimed for a stable Japanese
fishery management system. From 1954 to 1956, 318 vessels
were converted to the North Pacific salmon mother ship
type fishery.
--
12
The Bulganin Line
After the appointment of Ichiro Kono as Minister of
Agriculture and Forestry in 1955 a policy was hammered out,
which obtained an increase in the number of fleets allowed
to operate in the northern waters for 1956. The permit
would have been given to 19 fleets of 557 fishing vessels,
including new 2 additional fleets to Cape Olyutorskty area
for 1956. News of this Japanese fishery policy stimulated
the Soviet Union, which had been silent for a long time. In
a Soviet radio broadcast on March 21, 1956, they announced
that the Soviet government had established a regulation
area for the stock of salmon species. They limited Japan-
ese salmon fishing beyond what became commonly known as
"the Bulganin Line.,,12 The fish conservation zone encom-
passed the entire Sea of Okhotsk, the western part of the
Bering Sea, and the Pacific Ocean adjacent to the territorial
waters of the Soviet Union, to west and northwest of a
conventional line running from Cape Olyutorskt~ Bering
Sea,south along the meridian to pointLatitude 4SoN, Longi-
tude l70025'E, and then southwest until it reached the limits
of the territorial waters of the Soviet Union (see Fig. 4).
Just then, the Soviets broke off the Japanese-Soviet
Peace Treaty negotiations on March 20, 1956, and established
the conservation zone the next day. If the Soviets had en-
forced the policy, the Japanese salmon fishery would have
been unavoidably annihilated in the northern waters. Thus
it was a big shock for the Japanese government and fishery
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industry. The reason for the claim by the Soviets was.for
the protection of salmon stocks from Japanese fishing in
Kamchaka, Sakhalin, and Sea of Okhotsk waters. However, ac-
cording to the analysis of Japanese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the Soviets also wished to blame the failure of
their east coast fishery to reach their five-year plan fish
13harvesting goals on overfishing by the Japanese. The
Japanese government quickly established Japanese fishing in
the waters east of Longitude l70025'E until the settlement
of the problem. 1 4 The Soviets initiated the northery fishery
talks on the Bulganin Line, and the Japanese-Soviet Tentative
Fishery Treaty was settled on May 14, 1956, five months be-
fore the Japanese-Soviet Joint Declaration waS announced.
By the tentative fishery treaty, Japan (for 1956) was al-
lowed to harvest 65,000 metric tons 15 within the Bulganin
Line. Consequently, 14 Japanese fishery fleets in Aleutian
16
waters and 2 fishery fleets (decreasing from 5 fishing fleets)
in the Sea of Okhotsk were allowed to operate, and the fish-
ing operation in 1956 was less successful than expected, be-
cause of delays in the receipt of the necessary permit. The
fishery treaty was a draft convention concerning high seas
fishery in the entire Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk, and
Bering Sea, and included a draft agreement for cooperat.ion in
the rescue of persons in distress at sea. The effective
term of the treaty was 10 years. Since this time, the
Japanese mothership type salmon fishery has been decreased
by the Japanese-Soviet Fishery negotiations even though the
Bulganin Line was extinguished.
15
Japanese-Soviet Joint Declaration
The Soviet Union, which had not signed the San Francisco
Peace Treaty in 1951 (between Allied Powers and Japan) to
Japan, was very concerned for strategic and security reasons
about the improving relationships between Japan and the
United States through the Japan-U.S. Security Pact. There-
fore, the USSR appealed to Japan concerning the establishment
of diplomatic relations. However, Japanese Prime Minister
Yoshida, who was completely pro-American, did not accept any
proposals from the Soviet Union. But the Japanese public
opinion gradually changed showing a desire to normalize Japan-
Soviet diplomatic relations. This normalization was en-
couraged by the repatriation problem of 575,000 Japanese
prisoners of war, the problem of joining United Nations, and
the seizure of Japanese fishing boats in the northern
17
waters. The Hatoyama cabinet, which took office in December
1954, was favorably inclined toward normalization of rela-
tions with the Soviet Union, and the first Japanese-Soviet
negotiation began in London in June 1955. 1 8 But both parties
were confronted with the concept of the disputed northern
territories (see Fig. ~ The Japanese government asserted the
historical ownership of the northern four islands (Habamai
group, Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu), and suggested an
international conference concerning the reversion to Japanese
control of the northern Kuril Islands and southern Sakhalin.
Against Japan's claim, the Soviets agreed to return only
Habomai and Shikotan, and they broke off the talks on
16
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March 20, 1956. On March 21, 1956, the Soviet government sud-
denly announced the so-called "Bulganin Line," which was a
conservation zone for salmon species in the northern waters.
The Japanese government was upset by this apparent political
strategy and as a result,· the Japanese delegation (Kono .-
Mission) went to Moscow for the northern fishery talks which
inevitably involved the normalization of Japanese-Soviet re-
lations directly.
The northern fishery talks were started in Moscow on
April 29, 1956, with the understanding that negotiations
for the normalization of relations should resume not later
19than July 31, 1956. In the northern fishery talks, Japan
claimed the right to harvest 80,000 metric tons/year as op-
posed to the Soviet's desire to limit Japan's catch to 50,000
metric tons/year. Finally, the agreement allowed a Japanese
catch of 65,000 metric tons within the Bulganin Line for
1956. 2 0
Though these northern fishery talks paved the way for
the normalization of Japanese-Soviet relations, the Soviet
Union held a strict attitude in regard to the fishery regu-
lation, and used it as leverage in the normalization negoti-
ations. On the other hand in Japan, there was still
considerable controversy over the benefits of normal rela-
tions with the Soviets, and involved complicated political
circumstances with different factions in the Liberal Demo-
eratic Party (Governmental party). But there was a strong
desire to settle the northern fishery talks (regardless of
the cost) since the fishing season was coming soon. After
18
all, it was considered that the northern fishery talks had
been held due to the Soviet's initiative. The second peace
treaty negotiations resumed at the end of July 1956 in Moscow
but again floundered on the same impasse of the northern
territories and were discontinued on August 13, 1956. Dur-
ing the second negotiations, the Japanese government insti-
tuted its new policy in which it put an end to the immediate
belligerency by shelving the territorial issue, and emphasis
was therefore changed from actual peace treaty negotiations
to the normalization of relations. 21 Though the many minis-
terialists (Congressmen of the Governmental Party) and Oppo-
sition parties pressured the Hatoyarna Cabinet not to normalize
with the Soviets without settlement of the territorial issue,
Prime Minister Hatoyama, considering the problem of 575,000
Japanese prisoners of war in Siberia, attended the third
negotiations in Moscow from October 13, 1956. 22 The Joint
Declaration, which included an agreement to allow Japan to
join the united Nations and the return of Japanese prisoners
of war, was finally signed on October 19, 1956 (11 years
after the end of World War II). It deferred consideration
of the territorial issue to further negotiations for a
fully-fledged peace treaty. The Soviet Union did concede
to return Shikotan and the Habomai group on the conclusion
of such a treaty. However, the peace treaty has not been
settled yet, and the territorial issue remains unsolved to
the present.
19
Japanese-Soviet Fishery Negotiations
The High Seas Fisheries Convention was ratified on
December 1956. Consequently, the Northern Pacific Fisheries
Commission was established, which initiated annual meetings
held alternately in Tokyo and Moscow to determine the yearly
harvest of salmon, herring and crabs, and to make recommenda-
tions regarding conservation in the Sea of Okhotsk and the
northwest Pacific Ocean.
In the first annual Japanese-Soviet fishery negotia-
tions, held in Tokyo from February 1957, Japan wanted a
165,000 metric ton limit for salmon harvest, but the Soviets
said this should only be 80,000 metric tons. The Soviet's
claim was that Japanese mother ship type fishery overhar-
vested small salmon and salmon trout, and therefore few
salmon returned to spawn in Kamchatka in 1955. The Japanese
government changed its position to not- less than 145,000
metric tons and presented the new proposal that Japanese
catch limits would be determined by Japanese-Soviet joint
scientific surveys for the next year. But the Soviets re-
jected Japan's proposal. Therefore, the Japanese government
reduced their request to 120,000 metric tons. The Soviets
accepted Japan's final proposal with two conditions at-
tached. One was that the 120,000 metric ton catch of salmon
species for Japanese fishermen would be only for 1957 as an
exceptional measure. Another was that only two mother ship
type salmon fishery fleets would be allowed in the Sea of
Okhotsk instead of three fleets. 2 3 These regulations applied
20
only to the Japanese fishermen because the fishing on the
high seas of the convention area was done exclusively by
Japanese vessels. Soviet conservation claims were fortu-
nately brought to a halt, realizing that further disputa-
tion would fatally delay the departure of the Japanese fish-
ing fleets. Because of their unusual length, the Japanese-
Soviet fishery negotiations became known as the "lOO-day
. ,,24
meet1ngs.
In the second annual Japanese-Soviet fishery negotia-
tions in·1958, the Soviets claimed the total prohibition of
salmon fishing in the Sea of Okhotsk and drove Japan into a
corner. Japanese protest was to no avail, even though
Agriculture and Forestry Minister_Akagi intervened. The
Japanese government had to accept agreement closing the Sea
of Okhotsk to salmon fishery starting January 1, 1959, in
exchange for increasing Japan's catch from 80,000 metric tons
(Soviet proposal) to 110,000 metric tons for 1958. In the
meeting, though, Ambassador Akagi (Japanese Agriculture and
Forestry Minister) in Moscow obtained a guarantee to allow
the operation of Japan's salmon fishery during the next year.
However, the limit for 1958 was reduced to 100,000 metric
tons. Japanese Prime Minister Shinsuke Kishi, who had only
considered the immediate economic value of the extra 10,000
metric tons of salmon, accepted the Soviet proposal concerning
the closing of the Sea of Okhotsk to salmon fishing. The
fishing negotiations with the Soviet Union became the target
of adverse criticism by the public opinion in Japan, and
21
with good cause, since the initial Japanese agreement to end
fishing in the Sea of Okhotsk apparently led to the
expansion of areas closed to fishing by the Soviet Union,
and the eventual collapse of the Japanese northern Pacific
f ' h 25a s ery.
In the third annual Japanese-Soviet Fishery negotiations
in 1959, the Soviets desired to limit Japan's catch to 50,000
metric tons against 165,000 metric tons proposed by the
Japanese, and the Soviets had maintained their proposal
limiting Japan's catch to 50,000 metric tons until the sixth
annual Japanese-Soviet fishery negotiations in 1962. 2 6 In
1959, Japan met the Soviet's strong proposal for more clos-
ing areas and reducing the fishing season. Consequently,
Japan accepted its catch limits at only 85,000 metric tons
in compensation for the withdrawal of the Soviet proposal.
This tradeoff between the potential closing of fishing areas
and catch limitations became increasingly frequent in further
negotiations. In the fourth annual Japanese-Soviet fishery
negotiations in 1960, Japan suffered from Soviet political
criticism of its fishing practices and had to reduce its
catch by 17,500 metric tons (to 67,500 metric tons catch).
The extension of the Japan-U.S. Security Pact in 1960 re-
sulted in further negative action by the Soviet Union. 27
Japan, which did not have a good record for diplomacy, was
brought to a disadvantage in the subsequent Japanese-Soviet
fishery negotiations, and in the meeting in 1961, Japan
again decreased its catch to 60,000 metric tons. 28
22
The sixth annual Japanese-Soviety fishery negotiations in
1962 marked the development of a new phase. In September 1961,
when the Soviet Vice Prime Minister Mikoyan visited Japan in
connection with the industrial fair, he had a preliminary meet-
ing with the Japanese government. The Soviet Union demanded
the application of the regulations of the northern convention
to salmon fishing throughout the Pacific, because, the Soviets
argued, Japan had overharvested salmon in the areas south of
Latitude 45 0N. since its catch in the northern region had
been limited by the Japanese-Soviet Fishery negotiations
since 1957. 30
Japan finally consented in 1962 and accepted that the
regulation would extend to the south. Consequently, the meet-
ing made two regulation zones: A zone, in the north region
of Latitude 45 0N, and B zone, in the south area of Latitude
45 0N. Japan's catch was limited to 55,000 metric tons in A
zone and to 60,000 metric tons in B zone. Also, Japan was
reduced to one mother ship type salmon fishery fleet in A
zone and to 20% of total small scale salmon fishing vessels
which had previously operated in the south area in Latitude
45 0N (see Fig. 6). Despite these severe measures, the large
scale fishery by big enterprises (A zone) did not suffer a
deathblow because of their diversification in other industries
which buffered the economic impact. However, there was
great confusion in the small scale fishery by individuals
(B zone) with the curtailment of 81 fishing vessels. The
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small scale fishermen union complained to the Japanese govern-
ment that the cause of the Soviet's severe demands was a
product of an administrative mistake by the Japanese govern-
ment, which allowed the increase of the mother ship type of
fishing fleet from 3 fleets in_1952 to 16 fleets in 1956,
resulting in overfishing. But the small scale fishery in
1954 operated 1897 vessels which were decreased to 414 ves-
sels in 1962. Therefore, it was argued that the mother ship
type salmon fishery should be abolished. Since some local
governments involved with this affair supported their claims,
'b b' b' f ubI' 31 h1t ecame a 19 0 Ject 0 p 1C concern. T e Japanese
government paid compensation to small scale fishermen for
abolished vessels and tried to transfer these vessels to the
tuna fishery in the south.
Although'the salmon fishing regulations became increas-
ingly severe year after year, the maximum annual Japan's
catch of salmon was stable between 110,000 to 120,000 metric
tons in both zones togetheh between 1962 and 1966. The tenth
annual Japanese-Soviet fishery negotiations (1966), which
was the final year of High Seas Fisheries Convention, was
watched with keen interest, since it would determine the
future of Japanese northern Pacific fishery. The Japanese
were once again shaken with Soviet's plan for decreasing
Japanese salmon fishing vessels by 90%, and by compromise
Japan found it had to accept less than 100,000 metric tons
of its catch in both zones A and B.
25
In June 1966, Soviet Fisheries Minister Ishkov visited
Japan and agreed to extend the High Seas Fisheries Convention
every year. When Japan proposed the safety operation plan
near the northern territories, Ishkov presented a plan for
a Soviet fishing operation near Japan's coast. 33 Since Japan
rejected the Soviet proposal the safety operation plan near
the northern territories is not still actualized. But the
fishery negotiations from the eleventh annual session in
1967 to the fourteenth annual session in 1970 went smoothly,
allowing catch limitations from 108,000 metric tons during
rich haul years to 90,000 metric tons during lean haul years,
though slightly decreasing Japan's catch every year.
Japanese-Soviet Fishery Negotiations in the 1970s
After the fifteenth annual session in 1971, the situa-
tion had taken on a new phase. The Soviets added three main
claims which were: 1) the principle of roughly equal allo-
cations (Japanese high seas salmon fisheries and Soviet
coastal salmon fishers); 2) the enforcement by Soviet patrol
boats in the B zone to ensure conservation measures by the
Japanese in salmon harvesting (Soviet patrol boats have ~en­
forced in the A zone since 1962)34 and 3) the restriction
on herring fishing and the exclusion of crab fishing.
Beginning in 1967, with the regulation of bottom fishing,
the Soviets began to add restriction on fishing to other
fish categories. The catching of roe-bearing herring was
banned completely in the Sea of Okhotsk after 1971. 35 Snail
fishing was excluded since they represented a creature of
26
the shelf, since 1973. In addition, the crab fishing became
a source of dispute in 1964, when the international conven-
tion on the Continental Shelf became operative with the rati-
fication by 22 nations. When the convention recognized that
coastal states would have sovereign rights over the natural
resources of the continental shelf, the Soviet Union, which
ratified the convention, declared that crabs were a natural
resource of the continental shelf. Japan, which did not
ratify the convention, disputed that crabs were a creature
of the continental shelf. In fact, when the Soviet Union
signed an agreement in 1965 with the United States to limit
Soviet crab fishing in American waters, the Soviets felt
more than justified in increasing their catch in their own
shelf region. 36 The crab negotiations were separated from
the main negotiations and were held every March in Moscow
after 1969 and in which Japan's quota was decreased year af-
ter year. In 1975, Japan finally accepted that all areas
west of Kamchtka, which were the main grounds of Japanese
crab fishing, were closed to crab fishing. 37 Therefore, the
Japanese mother ship type of crab fishery was totally de-
stroyed.
With regard to salmon and the salmon-trout negotiations
which were held separately, Japan also fell in its permissible
catch to a level of 80,000 metric tons in 1976. In comparison
the actual number of tons of salmon caught by the Soviet
amounted to ~3 ,20Q metric tons in 1965, and 102,900 metric tons
in 1975. 38 And it is clear that despite the supposed Soviet
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policy of equal allocatio'n of Japanese-Soviet salmon harvest,
that Japan's harvest of salmon is steadily decreasing com-
pared to the Soviet harvest. Thus under these circumstances,
the Japanese salmon fisheries were continually cut down.
Japan in 1963 maintained 11 mother ships with 369 fish-
ing vessels in the mother ship type of fishery north of Lati-
tude 45°N, middle-size drift gillnet fishing vessels south of
Latitude 45°N, 1282 vessels in the small-size drift gillnet
fishery in the Pacific, 369 vessels in the longline fishery
in the Pacific, and 296 fishing vessels in the Sea of Japan.
In comparison, as a result of Soviet pressure, Japan in 1975
had a total of 10 mother ships with 333 fishing vessels, 287
middle-size drift gillnet fishing vessels south of Latitude
45°N, 1120 vessels in small-size drift gillnet fishery in
the Pacific, none in the longline fishery, and 170 fishing
vessels in the Sea of Japan.
In 1976, the Soviet Union finally demanded the banning
of herring harvest in the Sea of Okhotsk, and the cutback to
.
50% of Japan's actual catch in 1975 (54,000 metric tons) .39
The Japanese herring fishery, which was entirely managed by
small-scale fishermen, operated 251 fishing vessels in the
sea of Okhotsk. As a result, it presented a difficult prob-
lem in that the Japanese government might secure continued
salmon harvest by the sacrifice of a 50% reduction in herring
harvest during 1976. But even these problems were minor
compared to the eventual declaration of the 200-mile exclu-
sive fishing zone by the Soviet Union in December of 1976
following the similar U.S. 200-mile limit declaration.
III. THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES
28
The Political Ploy
The establishment of Soviet 200-mile limit in 1977 once
again brought up the northern territorial issue between Japan
and the Soviet Union. The "northern territories," which are
comprised of the islands of Etorofu, Shikotan, Kunashiri,
and Habomai group northeast of Hokkaido, Japan, have been
occupied by the Soviets since world War II, though Japan has
claimed its historical right to these four islands. In
December 1976, the Soviet Union declared its own 200-mile
zone which encompassed the northern territores (see Fig. 7).
The Japanese government immediately protested against this
action and reported its call for the return of the northern
territories. Also the Japanese press campaigned vigorously
against the Soviet Union's action simultaneously throughout
the country. The northern territorial issue, which involves
the safety fishing operation, is probably the most complex
political problem existing between Japan and the Soviet
Union, and remains unresolved.
In September 1976, Foreign Minister Miyazawa took a
three day trip as the first Japanese foreign minister to
Hokkaido to inspect the disputed islands. 40 During the two
days following the Miyazawa inspection, four Japanese fishing
vessels were seized off the northern territory. Also at this
time when the ~1IG-25 interceptor (a Soviet pilot flew it
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into Hakodate, Japan) was being examined on September 25, 1976
bY the U.S., a Japanese squid fishing boat was seized on the
high seas. So it appears that this seizure was an apparent
retaliation against Miyaqawa's inspection and the MIG-25 in
Japan, serving the interests of a third party, the U.S. It
is clear that these captures contributed to the delicate
Japanese-Soviet political re1ationships.41
After World War II, 1554 fishing vessels had been seized
by the Soviets. As of March 12, 1979, 575 ships had not
been returned, and 25 ships were sunk in which 37 fishermen
died. 4 2 The Soviets said that the sinkings occurred when
the Soviet Coast Guard vessel took a fishing boat in tow or
when a fishing boat tried to escape from the Soviet Coast
Guard vessel, and "it was swallowed up by the waves." The
northern seas are dangerous to men who earn a living from
them because of the rough heavy seas. The four islands,
Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomai group, which
~re one of the best fishing grounds in the world, are claimed
as Japanese historical territory by the Japanese government.
These fishing grounds had supported people who lived on the
four islands until just after the end of World War II when
the Soviet Union took occupation. After the 1956 Japan-
Soviet Joint Declaration, the Soviet Union still occupied
and still asserted a 12 mile territorial zone around the four
islands. The number of seizures have not decreased at all,
and many tragic events have occurred. For example, the
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fishermen have gone fishing on stormy days to take advantage
of the fact that the Soviet Coast Guard did not patrol on
such days. However, they could harvest ten times more fish
in the Soviet territorial zone (around the four islands)
than outside the zone, and they believed they had a right to
be there since the Japanese fishermen feel that the four
islands are their territory. From Miyazawa's inspection, it
was reported that the Japanese fishermen had little reluct-
ance to go within 12 miles of the islands, while the Japanese
Maritime Safety Agency vessel kept well outside the Soviet
. . 1 43 d hterrltorla zone. The Japanese government propose t e
"safe operation plan" (around the four islands) to the Soviet
Union several times, that safe fishing and northern territories
issue be separated and that safe fishing be guaranteed, but
they took no notice of these proposals (1965-Akagi Plan;
1969-Aichi Plan; 1972-Safe Operation Plan; and 1977-Suzuki
44Proposal) . Most of the captured fishing boats were 20 to
30 ton vessels and the arrested people were small-scale
fishermen from the port of Nemuro or the port of Hanazaki
in Nemuro in Hokkaido. The population of this city is 46,000,
36,0000f whom make a living by small-scale fishing. Other
captured fishing boats (from Nagasaki and Tottori) were
catching squid.
Historical Background
During World War II, the Kuril Islands had a very im-
portant significance to Japan's defense; because the Kuril
32
Islands are the nearest land mass to the Kamchatka, Aleutian
Islands, and Alaskan area. But the Japanese Military Force
was decreased to 23,000 in the Northern Kuril Islands at the
end of the war (1945) compared to 43,000 in the year before,
because of transfers to the South Pacific and Okinawa's de-
fense. 45
On August 9, 1945, the Soviet military force suddenly
attacked Manshu areas (Northern China), Korea, and South
Karafuto, disregarding the Russo-Japan Neutrality Pact (1941-
1946). Also, they attacked the Kuril Islands from Kamchatka
on the day after Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration
(the Allied Powers surrender ultimatum to Japan) on August
15, 1945. Then, the Soviet military force effected occu-
pation of Sakhalin, the Kuril Islands, Shikotan Island, and
the Habomai Island group the day before the Japanese signa-
46ture of surrender on September 2, 1945. Finally, the Soviet
Union incorporated this occupied area as territory of the
47Soviet Union in February 1946 without any treaty with Japan.
When Japan signed the Peace Treaty with the Allied Powers in
San Francisco in 1951, the Soviet Union did not become one
of the members of the Allied Powers. The state of war be-
tween Japan and the Soviet Union was ended in 1956 by the
Japanese-Soviet Joint Declaration, and the problem of the
northern territories and the peace treaty were shelved.
Consciousness of a territorial grievance against the
soviet Union dawned on the Japanese only gradually after
the war. At first, Japan was too numbed by the shock of
33
defeat and too preoccupied with finding food and shelter to
care. The Kuril Islands residents themselves thought of
little but how to survive. Repatriation filled the minds
of those caught unawares. Many Japanese believed the occu-
pation to be temporary. However, the Soviet Union incor-
porated this occupied area as territory of the Soviet Union.
On December 22, 1949, the Japanese government read its first
position paper on the northern territories in the Foreign
Affairs Committee of the Diet's House of Representatives. 48
Th t t t d 'd th Y It ' 1 I' 49 de s a emen enle e a a Agreement s ega lty an
asserted Japan's claim to the southern Kuril Islands
(Kunashiri and Etorofu) and southern Sakhalin. Japan re-
nounced all right to the Kuril Islands in the San Francisco
Peace Treaty. However, the wording was lithe Kuril Islands"
without further definition. Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida
denied at the San Francisco Peace Conference that Japan had
taken the Kuril Islands and southern Sakhalin by aggression
and insisted that Russia in the past had never disputed
Japanese ownership of the southern Kurils, and he also
charged that the Soviets were occupying, without authority,
islands which were part of Hokkaido (Shikotan, and the
llabomai group). U.S. Ambassador Dulles told the conference
that the United States believed the Habomai group and
Shikotan not to be a part of the Kurils, but he omitted men-
tion of Kunashiri and Etorofu. 50
The Soviet Union refused to sign the Japanese Peace
Treaty and for five years kept Japan out of the United Nations
34
by its veto power. Finally, in 1955, Japanese and Soviet dip-
10mats met in London to begin negotiations which resulted in
the resumption of diplomatic relations but with no agreement
on territories, and consequently no treaty of peace. During
the meeting in August 1955, the Soviet side unexpectedly modi-
fied its intractable position and consented to hand back
h i k d h b . d' . t 515 1 otan an t e Ha omal group; an agreement seeme lmmlnen.
But instead of accepting the Soviet concession, the Japanese
side raised new demands on August 30, 1955, which shifted the
retrocession of not only Shikotan and the Habomai group but
also Kunashiri and Etorofu and in addition asked that the
question of northern Kuri1 sovereignty be referred to an
international conference. 52 So, the Soviet Union broke off
the negotiations. The Soviet Union did not resume them un-
til the following year, but again they floundered on the
same impasse. The Joint Declaration, signed on October 19,
1956, provided that the Soviets would return the Habomai
Islands group and Shikotan Island to Japan only after a peace
treaty had been concluded. Japan pressed unremittingly for
the southern Kuri1s. But for the record, the southern Kuri1s
were claimed as historically Japanese, but their reversion
was not deemed essential to a peace treaty. Similarly, the
northern Kuri1s and southern Sakhalin had been used as bar-
gaining counters in the San Francisco conference. 53 The
U.S. State Department tried to bolster Japan's position in
an aide-memoire to Tokyo on September 7, 1956, discounting
the Yalta Agreement and supporting Japanese rights to
35
Kunashiri and Etorofu (the southern Kurils), but the United
States gesture reinforced rather than softened Soviet in-
. 54translgence.
Since 1960, shifts have slightly altered Soviet position
concerning the territorial issue. On January 27, 1960,
shortly after the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Pact,
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko announced that the islands
would be held until American forces had completely withdrawn
from Japan. 5 5 The Soviet Union insisted that the territorial
issue had been settled by the time Japan's Foreign Minister
visited Moscow in 1966 and 1967 to talk on the territorial
issue to improve relations. In December 1969, Prime Minister
Eisaku Sate urged adopting the "Okinawa formula" which would
secure Soviet recognition of Japan's residual sovereignty in
the southern Kurils as the first step towards retrocession.
At least twice the United Nations General Assembly has been
used as a forum for Japan's grievances. 56 Foreign Minister
Andrei Gromyko complained in 1972 that the northern terri-
t ' " h i h d h 57orles were glvlng 1m a ea ac e.
In January 1972, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko visited
Japan for talks with Japanese leaders. The Joint Communique
i~sued after the talks said that the two governments reached
agreement to talk again towards a peace treaty. Part of the
reason for Gromyko's visit to Japan was that the Soviet Union
was concerned over the restoration of diplomatic relations
between Japan and the People's Republic of China. 58 The
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Japanese-Soviet Peace Treaty negotiations reopened in December
1972. In October, 1973, Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka
in Moscow repeated Japan's position that the return of the
northern territories was an absolute precondition for the con-
clusion of a peace treaty.59 The Joint Communique at the end
of the talks noted· only that the two governments recognized
that the settlement of "yet unresolved problem remaining
since World War II could contribute to the establishment of
good neighborly relations between the two countries.,,60 The
Japanese government believed that the northern territorial
issue was an "unresolved problem." But in February 1976,
Soviet Secretary-General Brezhnev at the Twenty-fifth Party
Congress, denounced Japan's northern territory claims as
"unwarranted and illegitimate" and warned Japan not to yield
to temptation and call for support from Red China. 6l
When the Japanese restated their claims to the northern
territories, the Soviets once again held their position that
the matter was already settled. Then the Soviet government
declared the establishment of a 200-mile fishery zone in
December 1976, following the example of the u.S. 200-mile
fishery zone, and drew the Soviet border line within the
~orthern territories. In late February 1977, Japanese Agri-
culture and Forestry Minister Suzuki and Soviet Fisheries
Minister Ishkov met in Moscow, where the Soviets sought Japan-
ese recognition of the Soviet zone, including the northern
territories, and Japan refused. The two sides only agreed to
37
reopen negotiations in Moscow from March 15. Following the
Suzuki-Ishkov talks, Japan stoted. to declare its own 200-
mile fishery zone within the northern territories (see Fig.
8). In April 1977, Japanese Chief Cabinet, Sunao Sonoda,
in Moscow tried to make a political settlement at a second
round of negotiations; however, the talks were broken off.
Finally, Japan and the Soviet Union signed their fishery ne-
gotations in May 1977 (accepting the Soviet 200-mi1e zone)
with agreement which was interpreted by Japan that the
northern territories issue continued as a problem in mutual
relations. Thus the Soviet's 200-mi1e zone served to at
1 t . t' . h th " 62eas reopen negot1a 10ns concern1ng tenor ern terr1tor1es.
Japanese Foreign Minister Sonoda visited Moscow in
January 1978, and continued the northern territories issue
and the peace treaty talks. But Sonoda found that the talks
again floundered on the same impasse. These maneuvers have
not brought the northern territories problem closer to a solu-
tion since the Japanese government formally claimed the
northern territories in 1949. 6 3
The Japanese View of the Northern Territories Issue
The position of Japan is that Japan has a historical
right to the northern territories, which was previously occu-
pied only by Japanese and had never passed into foreign hands.
The Matsumae feudal clan under Tokugawa Shogun took a field
survey of eastern Hokkaido and southern Sakhalin. in 1635.
Meanwhile, Russia occupied the Kamchatka Peninsula by the
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end of the 17th century, and soon started to extend its power
to the Kuri1 Islands. The fact became the basis for Soviet's
recent claim to not only the northern Kuri1 Islands, but also
Etorofu, and Kunashiri (the soutern Kuri1s) which belonged
to their territory earlier than to Japan. In the middle of
the 18th century, when the Russians carne to the southern Kuri1
Islands, the Matsumae feudal clan had only extended its influ-
ence to Kunashiri Island. It seems that the Russians went
to Etorofu Island first, but did not manage the island to any
significant degree. Russia established a colonial settlement
on Urqpu Island, but they abandoned it and left Uruppl Island in
1805. Under those circumstances, it is hard to judge that
these islands, south of Etorofu Island, became Russian terri-
tory even for a short tirne. 64 On the other hand, the Tokugawa
Shogunate had taken a field sruvey of the Kuri1 Islands in
1785. And in 1799, the Tokugawa Shogunate had fortified
eastern Ezo under the direct control of the shogunate, as
well as established a community in _Etorofu Island in 1800.
This direct action by the Tokugawa shogunate was taken to
guard against Russian influence in the area since the
Matsumae clan was not strong enough to do this.
Japan thus established its jurisdiction to the southern
Kuri1 Islands in the early 19th century. On the Fussian
side, Captain Gorovnin and other crews were caught by the
Japanese for investigating and attack±.ng a Japanese settle-
ment in 1811. After they were released in 1813, Russia
stopped their activity in the southern Kuri1 Islands
40
temporarily because they moved their focus of attention from
the southern Kuril Island to Sakhalin. In 1821, the Tokugawa
released the southern Kuril Island from direct control of
the shoguate and gave jurisdiction back to the Matsurnae
feudal clan. Russian influence in the area was apparently
waning.
In 1853, the Russian ambassador extraordinaire and
plenipotentiary Fuphinimi Vasilivich Putiatin visited Japan
for the negotation of the settlement of boundaries and open-
ing of trade with Japan. Previously, the Tokugawa Shogunate
of Japan in 1639 had adopted a closed-door policy, whereby
travel to any foreign country for any purpose was strictly
limited. It was not until 1853, when American Commodore
Perry's "Black Ship" made its awe-inspiring appearance at
Uraga, Japan, that its door was reluctantly opened. 6 5
As a result of negotiations between Japan and Russia,
the Japanese-Russian Commercial Treaty (Shimoda Treaty) was
signed and sealed. Article 2 placed jurisdiction of
Etorofu Island under Japan and jurisdiction to control the
north islands from UrtpPu. .lSland to Shurnshu Island (see Fig. 9)
under Russian control, and it was agreed to jointly manage
Sakhalin. 66 After the treaty, the problem of boundaries be-
tween Japan and Russia lasted until 1875 when Sakhalin be-
came the joint property under both countries. The development
of Sakhalin was started at an early time by Japah, but Russia
also extended its power there by sending its exiles to settle
in northern Sakhalin, taking advantage of the changeover of
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the Tokugawa Shogunate to the Meiji government (1868-1913).
Japan's interest was only in the summer season fishery around
the coasts of Sakhalin and few people settled there after
the end of Tokugawa Shogunate. After the Meiji restoration,
the new government increased its recognition of the Sakhalin
problem which was a menace to the public tranquility of
Hokkaido, since the joint management of Sakhalin was an un-
stable situation. The Japanese government decided the terri-
torial problem of Sakhalin and reached a peaceful settlement
by concluding the Sakhalin-Kuril Islands Exchange Treaty with
the Russians in 1875, but did so under political disadvant-
age in the negotiations. 6 7
Japan accepted that Sakhalin become Russian territory and
Russia accepted that the Kuril Islands (18 islands from Uruppu
Island to Shumshu Island) become Japanese territory. Thus
all Kuril Island became Japanese territory, while Sakhalin
was accepted as Russian territory.
After the end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, Japan
occupied southern Sakhalin as Japan's territory, and both
Japan and Russia settled its borderline at Latitude SOoN in
the Portsmouth Peace Conference under the mediation of
President Theodore 68Roosevelt.
After World War II, Japan renounced its jurisdiction
and claim to the Kuril Islands and southern Sakhalin in
Article 2-C of the peace treaty in the San Francisco Peace
Conference. 69 The Soviet Union, which occupied these areas,
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voiced its discontent that there was no mention that the Kurils
and southern Sakhalin belonged to the Soviet Union, and they
therefore refused to sign its peace treaty. Japan claimed
that the northern territories were not included in the area
renounced as were the Kuril Islands, but asserted historical
rights and pointed to history between Japan and Russia. How-
ever, the Soviet Union at the Japanese-Soviet peace negotia-
tions in London claimed that the four islands (Etorofu,
Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomi group), were part of
the Kurils. America's position in May 1947, was publicly
stated in support of Japanese claim to the four islands. 70
Also, according to Article 25, it specified that only the
Allied Powers who had ratified the San Francisco Peace Treaty
should derive rights and benefits from it. Therefore, it is
clear that the Soviet Union does not have any right to its
claim to the Kurils including the northern territories, on
grounds of the San Francisco Peace Treaty (see Fig. 10).
The Soviet View of the Northern Territories Issue
The present position of the Soviet Union is that there
is no territorial issue with Japan due to several interna-
tional agreements formed at the end of World War II: The
Cairo Declaration, the Yalta Agreement, the Potsdam Proclama-
tion, and the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The Cairo Declar-
ation of November 1943, in which the united States, Britain,
and China in the Allied Powers proposed that Japan should be
stripped of all islands in the Pacific which she had seized
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and occupied since the beginning of the first World War in
1914, and that all the territories Japan had stolen from the
Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, would
be restored to the Republic of China. Further, Japan would
also be expelled from all other territories which she had
taken by violence 'and greed.
The leaders of three great powers, the Soviet Union,
United States, and Great Britain, agreed in February 1945 that
in two or three months after Germany had surrendered and the
war in Europe had terminated,' that the Soviet Union would en-
ter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allied
Powers. The Yalta Agreement stated that the former rights
of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904
would be restored, and that the southern part of Sakhalin as
well as all islands adjacent to it would be returned to the
Soviet Union (Article 2-a), and further that the Kuril
Islands would be handed over to the Soviet Union (Article 3).
The Potsdam Declaration stated that the terms of the Cairo
Declaration would be carried out and that Japanese sovereignty
would be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu,
Shikoku and such minor islands as were determined (Article 8).
The San Francisco Peace Treaty stated that Japan renounce all
right, title and claim to the Kuril Islands, and that portion
of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan
acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of
Portsmouth of September 5, 1905 (Article 2-C). The Russians
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cited all of these agreements to prove that the Kuril Islands
were ceded to them. In fact, the Soviets incorporated this
occupied area as territory of the Soviet Union in 1946.
Japan disputes the Soviet's claim on several points.
Firstly, it is argued that the Cairo Declaration did not spe-
cifically point out the Kuril Islands. Originally, the Kuril
Islands were transferred to Japan peacefully by concluding
the Sakhalin-Kuril Island Exchange Treaty in 1875, thus were
not areas which Japan had taken by violence and greed. Also,
the Cairo Declaration made assurances that the Allied Powers
coveted no gain for themselves and had no thought of territorial
expansion. The Soviets themselves violated the Cairo
Declaration by illegal occupation of Japanese territories.
With the Yalta Agreement, the Japanese position is that
it is not binding on Japan because the agreement was concluded
without Japan's participation or knowledge. In attacking and
annexing the Kuril Islands, the Soviet Union violated the
1941 Neutrality Pact (1941-1946)71 and betrayed the principle
of non-aggression contained in the Atlantic Charter to which
Moscow had subscribed. In September 1956, the United States
announced that the Yalta Agreement did not affect any legal
position concerning the territorial problems.
Another point is that the Potsdam Declaration limited
Japan to the four main islands, but it added a reference to
"such minor islands as we determine" which could well include
the Kuril Islands. Also, though Japan renounced all rights
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to the Kuril Islands in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan
did not really compromise its claim to Kunashiri and Etorofu,
for the latter two are legally not part of the Kuril Islands
as defined in the treaties of 1855 and 1875.
The Soviet's Intention
There exists at least three main reasons why the Soviets
insisted that there were no territorial problems. First,
the Soviet Union doubted that Japan would be satisfied with
only the return of the northern territories, since it seemed
obvious that Japan would claim the return of the Kuril Islands
and southern Sakhalin. Because of the position of the Japan-
ese government maintaining its historical right to the northern
territories, Japan proposed that the jurisdictional question
of the Kuril Islands and southern Sakhalin be brought into
International Conference by the Allied powers under the con-
ditions ratified in the San Francisco Peace Conference.
Secondly, thus it is not surprising that the Russians
have clung so tenaciously to their position. After World
War II, the area which was occupied by the Soviet Union is
nearly 760,000 square kilometers (5,000 square kilometers
from the northern territories). The Soviet Union is reluctant
to return territory to Japan in the face of the principles
incorporated in the treaty with West Germany, Finland, and
Poland, and the troublesome border problems with especially
Communist China. The Kremlin wanted to hold up this treaty
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as a precedent for freezing boundaries with Japan.
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Third, the Soviets have regarded the northern territories
as of some importance to their security. The Soviet naval
strength in the Pacific area is practically guaranteed by the
occupation of the northern territories. At the end of World
War II, the Kremlin attempted to divide Hokkaido for occupa-
tion by the Soviet Union and the United States, in much the
same manner as East and West Germany are occupied by separate
factions. However, the U.S. occupied all of Japan except
the northern territories and refused the Soviet plan. The
primary aim of the Soviets was to have complete control over
internal waters in the Sea of Okhotsk. Etorofu and Kunashiri
in the northern territories are important locations for the mili-
tary. Tancup Bay in Etorofu Island provides exceptionally
good conditions for the naval base where the Japanese Combined
Fleet historically concentrated for attacking Pearl Harbor
in Hawaii. The Japanese Defense Agency confirmed in June
1978 that Soviet task forces had moved into the Etorofu area.
Before World War II, the Soviet movement to the Pacific Ocean
was blocked by the Japanese territory. But the situation has
taken a new turn since the Soviets occupied the northern
territories. Securing the Soviet sea frontiers to Kamchatka
and maintaining free navigation routes to the Pacific Ocean
resulted in protection of the coastal military facilities in
the mainland of Soviet Union and has allowed for additional
military pressure against the People's Republic of China,
Japan, and the United States.
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Possible Solutions
From Nossapu Point at the end of Nemuro Peninsula, the
Japanese can watch Russian soldiers on patrol on an island?3
less than three miles away. The local inhabitants of Nemuro
are fishermen and collectors of tangle. The tangle, a special
kind of seaweed, is found in these waters and is highly
prized by the Japanese. At one point, the Soviet prohibited
tangle-collecting in the vicinity of their islands and were
constantly seizing Nemuro fishermen. The situation has
changed. In 1963, the private level tangle agreement was
signed in Moscow providing that specified numbers of Japanese
small boats would be permitted to operate in the waters near
Kaigara Island and Suisho Island in the Habomai group. How-
ever, Nemuro's citizens have not been relieved of all harass-
ment from the Russians. Seizures of boats and men have become
less frequent but have not ceased. Also the Soviets have
done bombing practice in their fishing grounds. Such acts
causing such great distress to Japanese fishermen are diffi-
cult to handle. The Soviet Union's only obligation is to
notify ships and aircraft to keep out of the bomb practice
zones. Therefore, Japanese fishermen are still detained in
the Soviet Union. Under these circumstances, Nemuros' fisher-
men became more interested in the safety of their men and
their boats than in agitating for reversion. But the Soviet
Union once again prohibited the collection of tangle around
these islands in the Habomai group, this time by the estab-
lishment of Soviet 200-mile zone, and there is little
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likelihood that Japanese small boats will be permitted to oper-
ate in the waters of the Habomai group.
According to the Soviet presses in recent years, the
fishery industries in Kunashiri maintained large mackerel
pike fishing fleets and its processors in Etorofu which pro-
duced 300 million fish cans in 1971. Other industries on
Etorofu harvested 3 million fishes including salmon, salmon-
94
trout, and Alaska pollock. More recently the Soviet
National Park project on both islands is being planned as a
resort zone for Russians from the mainland. However, it is
also evident that the Soviet Union has steadily strengthened
its military power into the northern territories. On
February 5, 1979, aerial photographs published in Japanese
newspapers showed that the Soviet Union has constructed a
1 'l't 'b K h" 75arge ffi1 ~ ary a~r ase on unas ~r~. These photographs
appeared after an unexpected statement by the Japanese oe-
fense Agency last month that the Soviet Union had constructed
permanent military bases on Kunashiri and Etorofu. The
newspapers reported that the aerial photographs of Kunashiri
were taken February 2, 1979, from its own plane in Japanese
air space, but the flight prompted at least two Soviet air
defense aircrafts to,scranble. The Japanese Defense Agency
officials said the Soviet Union has developed about 5,000
to 6,000 grQund troops on the islands of Kunashiri and
Etorofu. The Japanese Foreign Minister Sonoda lodged a pro-
test on February 5, 1979 with the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo
against the military build-up on the northern territories. 76
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However, the Soviet Ambassador Bozuchsky claimed the same
day that the northern territorial issue has been settled,
therefore the Japanese were attempting to interfere with the
internal affairs of the Soviet Union. 77 Additionally,
a Moscow broadcast announced that the cause of building the
military base in the Islands of Kunoshiri and Etorofu was
due to Japan's international affairs. The added security
of the Kuri1s was needed due to Japan's relationship between
and with Communist China, especially since Japan already had
supposedly sufficient defense with the U.S.-Japan Security
Pact. 78 The establishment of the Soviet Union's military
bases in the northern territories was rapidly developed, and
seems to be to some extent a retaliatory measure to the
Japan-Peop1e's Republic of China peace treaty. The fear of
both territorial and strategic considerations probably dic-
tated Soviet retention of the northern territories.
If Japan would happen to withdraw from the Japanese-
U.S. security relationship or if some other circumstance
occurred offering a patent advantage to the Soviet Union,
the Soviets might find it expedient to sign a peace treaty
with Japan and, in accordance with the 1956 declaration,
agree to give back Shikotan and the Habomai group. There
is little likelihood that the southern Kuri1es, Kunashiri
and Etorofu, would be returned. However, the Japanese
government has not changed its position of the Soviet Union
being Japan's most feared enemy. The Soviet Unions policy
was to consider the northern territorial issue settled when
Japan accepted Soviet's 200-mi1e fishery zone which included
the northern territories.
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IV. THE JAPANESE-SOVIET FISHERY NEGOTIATIONS AND THE SOVIET
200 MILE LIMIT
The Soviet Fishery Policy
In recent years the Soviet Fishery has made remarkable
progress. The Soviet's catch, which in 1960 was only 3.5
million metric tons, increased to 7 million metric tons in
1970, and reached over 10 million metric tons in 1976. The
Soviet government has recently placed emphasis on exploiting
the world's oceans to meet the protein needs of the Soviet
nation. Thus the Soviets worked to increase fish harvest
from distant water operations. Over 90% of the Soviet total
harvest of fishes were caught from distant waters in 1975.
In 1975, a bad crop year caused a shortage of cereal feeds
for livestock supplies. Consequently, it became a policy to
insure protein supplies from the sea and the Soviets an-
nounced a new five-year project to increase their total catch
of fishes another 32 percent by 1980. 79 During this progress,
the Soviet Pacific Fishery has always held a leading position
in the Soviet Fishery. Therefore, the Soviet Union has aimed
to suppress the Japanese fishery near their coasts. The
Soviets claimed that crabs were a creature of the continental
shelf, and shut ou~ Japanese crab fishing in most of Soviet's
continental shelf. The Soviet position with Japan on Salmon
and salmon trout had used the principle of equal allocation.
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However, the soviet salmon fishery had operated only in its
coastal waters, thus the soviet's salmon catch had always
been less than Japan's since they operated on the high seas.
But as previously discussed, the allowable Japanese salmon
harvests were decreased in the annual negotiations with the
Soviet union from year to year. The Soviet's desire was to
regulate Japanese salmon fishery on the international waters
and thereby increase their salmon harvest in the coastal
waters.
However, the Soviet interests in the ocean is not only
fishery, but also in a merchant fleet and in naval power.
Also Soviet fishing vessels often operate as intelligence
ships. Therefore, the advance of Soviet fishing fleet to the
distant waters is a result of both economic and political
desires, forming the so-called "the Red Ocean Strategy.,,80
The Soviet 200-mile Fishery Zone
The participating nations in the Third Law of the Sea
Conference sought to make new ocean policies and to reach
agreements on various aspects of the sea. In 1976, the
United States announced the establishment of their 200-mile
exclusive fishery zone requiring foreign countries to nego-
tiate for permission to fish in their waters. The Soviet
Union in November 1976, recognizing the new U.S. 200-mile
fishery zone, signed a U.S.-Soviet agreement, and subsequently
declared their own 200-mile fishery zone on December 10, 1976. 8 1
And the Soviets announced on February 24, 1977 that they
would implement regulations starting March 1, 1977. As
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stated in the announcement, the waters around the northern
territories, which are disputed for ownership by Japan, were
declared under Soviet jurisdiction. The Japanese government
immediately lodged a protest against the Soviet measure on
February 25 to the effect that Japan could not recognize such
a unilateral action on the part of the Soviet Union. 8 2
Under such severe disagreement, the Japanese-Soviet Fishery
Interim Agreement negotiations were held in February, 1977.
It was realized that it would be difficult to reach agree-
ment. But before the negotiations, Japan had to accept the
Soviet fishery jurisdiction claim in order not to compromise
Japan's claim to the northern territories and its insistence
on safe fishing for Japanese vessels in the coastal waters
of those territories (which still does not exist). The
Soviet Union intended to settle the northern territories is-
, 'f' h t' t' 81sue 1n upcom1ng 1S ery nego 1a 1ons. Thus they designed
a short final meeting in Tokyo from March 15 to March 31,
1977. The annual Japanese-Soviet Fishery neg~iations, were
generally known as the "100 day meetings." The meeting in
1977 included more complex problems. It is clear that the
Soviet's aim was the acceptance of its judrisdictional claim
to the northern territories without giving the Japanese
government time to protest since it was eager to prevent de-
lay in the departure of the Japanese Northern Pacific fishery
vessels. The negotiations became deadlocked however, and
the Soviet mission left Japan on March 31, 1977. 83 The public
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in Japan strongly supported its claim for reversion of the
northern territories on this occasion and protested against
the Soviet Union's measure.
During the talks in March 1977, Japan stated to declare
its own 200-mi1e fishery zone within the northern territories.
On AprilS, 1977, the Japanese Chief of Cabinet, Sunao Sonoda,
tried in Moscow to make a political settlement at a second
round of negotiations: however, the talks broke off on April
8, 1977. 84 Then the Soviet Union announced on April 29, 1977
the denouncing of the Japanese-Soviet Fishery Treaty (the
High Seas Fishery Convention). Although there was the increas-
ing possibility that there would be no Japanese catch quota
for 1977 in the Soviet 200-mi1e fishery zone, the Japanese
government kept its strong position on the northern territories
with popular support from the nation as a whole and the en-
, i e t; emb h i 85 h d . d 1 d ht1re D1 m ers 1p. T ey eS1re to cone u e t ese ne-
gotiations in such a form as did not in any way prejudice
its position on this territorial issue. On May 2, 1977, the
Japan's Diet approved a law extending Japan's territorial
sea to twelve miles and its fishery jurisdiction to 200 miles,
and on May 3, 1977, Japanese Agriculture and Forestry
Minister Suzuki visited Moscow for the third round of fishery
t " 86nego 1at1ons. Finally, Japan and the Soviet Union signed
tneir fishery negotiations on May 27, 1977, with an agreement
which could be interpreted to allow Japan to continue to
insist that the northern territories issue continue to be a
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a problem in mutual relations. Thus the Soviet 200-mi1e zone
served to at least reopen talks concerning the northern terri-
t . 87orles. Subsequently, interim negotiations, which provide
for the terms and conditions of Soviet fishing operations
in Japanese 200-mi1e fishery zone,were held from June 30, 1977
88
and concluded on August 4, 1977.
Under the Japanese-Soviet Fishery Interim Agreement in
1977, Japan's total 1977 allocation ~ ~e Soviet 200-mi1e
zone was set at 455,000 metric tons from June to December,
which was a 40 percent decrease in the annual harvest of 1976
(1,538,000 metric tons). As a result, 7,400 fishing vessels
in 1976 were decreased to 6,335 fishing vessels. In addition,
Japan's fishing areas were limited to only seven fishing
areas in 1977 in the Soviet 200 mile zone (see Figure 11).
Thus Japanese fishermen suffered a drastic reduction in har-
vest due to the new Soviet regulation in which the allowable
catch of Alaska pollock was cut back from 1,073,000 metric
tons to 100,000 metric tons, including the prohibition of
Japan's main fishing in the western Kamchatka area. Only
22 Alaska pollock fishing vessels survived out of 154 fish-
ing vessels used during 1976. 8 9 The Alaska pollock price
was low so fishermen had to harvest more to break even. The
main base port for the northern fisheries is in the city of
Kushiro whose fishermen have been the largest harvesters of
fish from 1964 to 1976. In 1976, Japan's total harvest was
1,073,000 metric tons with Alaska pollock representing 100,000
U.S.S.R.
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Figure 11. Japanese fishing areas in the Soviet 200 mile zone
after 1977.
t · t 90me r~c ons. Also the cheap price of fish aided the de-
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velopment of the marine manufacturing processing industry.
Most port towns in Hokkaido and T~hoku area sustain very
small manufacturing/processing industries and their economy
status is based on fish. Under this situation, more than
10,000 people lost their jobs in the city of Kushiro (popu-
lation 200,000) .91
In 1977, the Japanese small scale crab and shrimp fish-
eries in the Soviet zone had their allocations reduced by
50 percent of the 1976 limit. Also the flounder trawl fish-
ery in the southern Kamchatka (164 fishing vessels), the
herring fishery, and tangle collecting around the Habomai
Island group in the Soviet zone were totally destroyed. 9 2
Approximately 42,000 metric tons of herring were caught in
1976, but the Soviet Union prohibited the harvesting of her-
ring in their 200-mile zone in 1977. So the City of Wakkanai
(population 55,000), which is the main base port of the
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herring fishery, suffered an 80 percent financial loss.
It is difficult to change from a herring fishery to any
other type of fishery, therefore it presented a complex situ-
ation to the fishery business world. The prohibition of
tangle collecting around Habomai Island group was a Soviet
reprisal measure reacting to the Japanese government's re-
jection of their proposal of fishing operations within Japan's
territorial waters. 9 4 The total Soviet allocation in the
Japanese 200-mile zone in 1977 was set at 335,000 metric tons
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from July to December, which was 31 percent below the annual
catch in 1976. However, their most desirable catch, includ-
ing sardines and mackerel, was reduced only 10 percent. 9 5
Finally, Japan's salmon allocation, which was discussed sepa-
rately from the main negotiations, was set at 62,000 metric
tons in 1977, and lost 18,000 metric tons from banning of
salmon catch within the Soviet 200-mile zone. 9 6
The substantial destruction of the Japanese northern
fisheries not only broke down the base of the Japanese dis-
tant water fisheries but also deprived fishermen of a living
and hurt the marine processing and related industries. Thus,
a critical situation exists for all citizens of ports in the
Hokkaido and Tohoku areas.
The Fishery Negotiations of 1978
In September, 1977, Japan and the Soviet Union reached
agreement to extend the two fishery interim agreements for
one year beyond their original dates of expiration (the end
of 1977), and resumed their talks for their 1978 allocations
on November 22, 1977. Before these negotiations began, the
Soviet Ministry of Fisheries announced that it would be will-
ing to approve as much as 840,000 metric tons for Japanese
fishermen in the Soviet zone. The Soviets also proposed
670,000 metric tons for Soviet fishermen in the Japanese zone.
These annual figures were arrived at by simple extrapolation
of the 1977 quotas, which were 700,000 metric tons for Japan
during March-December and 335,000 metric tons for the Soviet
Union during July-December. 9 7
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The Soviet Union modified its position during the first
week of negotiations, and demanded that Japan increase the
1978 quotas for the Soviets to enable them to catch as much
as the Japanese in the Soviet zone. On November 28, 1977,
the Soviets proposed that Japan would be allowed to catch
only 700,000 metric tons (the same as the March-December
1977 allocation) and threatened to reduce Japanese quotas
even further if their demand was not met. This tough ,soviet
demand c~e in response to the Japanese proposal of a 378,000
metric tons allocation for the Soviets, only 43,000 metric
tons more than their quota fur the last six months of 1977. 98
The failure to agree on a quota formula continued through-
out the negotiations. On December 13, 1977, the Soviet Fish-
eries Minister Ishkov presented to Japan the final Soviet
quota proposal, 850,000 metric tons for Japan and 650,000
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metric tons for the Soviets, which Japan ultimately accepted.
But initially Japan rejected it because the 850,000 metric
tons allocation represented only about half of the previous
maximum catch by Japan in Soviet zone, while the 650,000
metric tons allocation was roughly equal to the past maximum
Soviet catch off Japan. Japan also expressed opposition to
extrapolating its 700,000 metric tons March-December quota
for 1977 into an annual quota for 1978 by adding amounts for
January and February only. Because Japanese fishing vessels
were not allowed to fish in the Soviet 200-mi1e zone during
April and May while negotiations on an interim agreement were
mprogress, Japan felt that the 700,000 metric tons allocation
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should also be adjusted to reflect the lack of fishing dur-
ing these two months. When it became evident, however, that
the Soviet Union would never agree to Japan's proposal for a
378,000 metric tons Soviet allocation in the Japanese zone
and would not consider a revision of its own allocation pro-
posal based on the "equivalent principle," Japan informed the
Soviet Union on December 15, 1977 that it would accept the
Soviet proposal. The decision was also influenced by the fact
that Japan would not be able to begin operations in the Soviet
200-mile zone in early 1978, if the Soviet proposal were re-
o t d l OOJec e .
Japanese Agriculture and Forestry Ministry officials
stated on December 15, 1977 that it was inevitable for Japan
to agree to the Soviet proposal, although they were dis-
appointed with the results. Japan's 850,000 metric tons allo-
cation represented a 45 percent decrease from its 1976 catch
of 1,538,000 metric tons while the Soviet allocation of
650,000 metric tons was only about 2 percent less than their
1977 catch which was the Soviet historical catch level in
the Japanese 200-mile zone. l Ol Part of the reason for the
strong negotiation effort was that the Soviet Union did not
conclude its fisheries negotiation with European Economic
Community Countries for 1977, and lost about 600,000 metric
tons of its 1976 catch. Under these conditions, the Soviet
Fisheries Delegation in Tokyo had felt under
serious pressure to find a way to succeed in their five year
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plan (1976-198 0). This severe position of the Soviet Union
also had an effect on the five-year Japanese-Soviet Bilateral
Fishery Cooperation Agreement pertaining to the high seas
salmon fishery convention in the international waters of
the northwest Pacific.
The Five-Year Japanese-Soviet Bilateral Fishery Coopera-
tion Agreement
When there was a worldwide acceptance for the banning of
salmon fishing in international waters due to parent-stream
jurisdictional control claims, Japan, which asserted the right
of salmon fishing in international waters, was in a hard po-
sition. 1 0 2 Under these international circumstances, in
February 1978, the North Pacific Fishery Conference was held
in Vancouver by Japan, Canada, and the United States. The
North Pacific Fishery Convention had acted in the northeast
Pacific Ocean since 1953, however, the United States denounced
its treaty under the establishment of U.S. 200-mile fishery
zone. This meeting considered salmon catch regulations in
the northeast Pacific. Finally Japan agreed to the U.S.
claim, which resulted in its reluctant acceptance of the prin-
ciple of abstention from salmon fishing from Longitude
l75°W to Longitude l75°E. 1 0 3 Certainly this result had a strong
influence on the upcoming Japanese-Soviet salmon fishery
negotiations, which were held in Moscow on February 15, 1978.
The Soviet Union first proposed a total ban on salmon
fishing in the international waters on the grounds of preserv-
ing riverborn salmon resources and included Japanese 200-mile
zone. If Japan accepted the Soviet's proposal, 50 percent
of total 1977 Japan salmon catch would be cut back, with
mother ship type of salmon fishery (6 mother ships and 245
fishing vessels), middle-sized drift gillnet fishery (298
fishing vessels) being totally destroyed, and nearly 100,000
people (25,000 fishermen) losing their jObs. l 0 4 Therefore,
the Japanese proposed the 1978 quota of 62,000 metric tons
as the same as the 1977 quota. The Soviet Union's 1978 ne-
gotations were strongly influenced by Japan's developing re-
I t ' h' 'th C ' t Ch' 105 th 1977 f' ha ~ons ~p w~ ommun~s ~na. In e ~s ery ne-
gotiations, the Soviets essentially gave Japan a choice of
fish or the northern territories, and in the 1978 the choice
was fish or Communist China.
Just before the talks broke off, the Soviet Union on
March 24, retracted its stand proposing that regulations
governing salmon fishing be renegotiated in 1978 towards
annual bilateral consultations. One of the reasons the
Soviets changed their position in the meeting was that Japan-
ese government finally decided to form their relationship
with Communist China, and Japanese Foreign Affairs Minister
Sonoda went to the People's Republic of China for making
106the final agreement. Therefore, the Soviet Union moved
its fishery negotiations strictly to the topic of fish. When
the meeting resumed on AprilS, the Soviet Union presented
a new proposal: Japn's 1978 quota would be 35,500 metric
tons (57.5% of the 1977 quota) an area north of Latitude
44°N (A zone; a traditional fishing ground for mother ship
type of fishery) would be closed for salmon fishing, and
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the fishing season for 1978 would be set for a three-month
period from May 1 through July 1, as compared to from April
30 through August 10 in the last year. 1 0 7 It is clear that
the Soviet's policy'was attempting to exclude the Japanese
salmon fishing in international waters by decreasing Japan's
quota year after year. The Japanese government also presented
a new proposal in which Japan would give "fishing coopera-
tion" to the Soviet Union under the condition that Japan's
1978 quota remain the same as the 1977 quota. The" fishery
cooperation proj ect" was that the Japanese government would
establish 12 salmon culture fisheries institutions on the
Soviet Coast in 5 years, and there would be 50 million
dollars total payment by the Japanese government. However,
the Soviet Union rejected it. 1 08
While the talks were having trouble with quota, the
North Pacific Fishery Conference in Washington, D.C. was
concluded April 16, which resulted in Japan's reluctant ac-
ceptance of total abstention (no Japanese salmon fishing
beyond Longitude l75°E) (see Fig. 12). Japan's acceptance
made difficult its own claim against the Soviet Union, which
proposed the total ban of salmon fishing in international
waters. According to the Japanese Fisheries Agency report
in the case of acceptance of Soviet's proposal, Japan would
lose 42,000 metric tons of its allocation of 62,000 metric
tons in 1977, in addition to the limitation of 14,000 metric
tons by the North Pacific Fishery Conference. It was
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Figure 12. Prohibited areas for Japanese salmon fishing, 1978.
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predicted that eventually Japan would harvest only 6,000
metric tons (10 percent of the 1977 harvest) .109 Under this
severe situation, Japan proposed a new plan in which the
Japanese northern fisheries industries would make a payment
in goods into a "fishery cooperation fund" which in 1978
would total about 8.6 million dollars. The Soviet government
had interest in this plan, and proposed that they be allowed
to catch a total of 42,500 metric tons, adjacent to the re-
stricted area west of Longitude l75°E to Longitude l70 oE,
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and extended the season from July 1 to July 31.
Finally the five-year Japanese-Soviet Bilateral Fishery
Cooperation Agreement was signed in Moscow on April 21, 1978.
In the agreement on the Japanese catching of salmon in the
northwest Pacific outside of the Soviet 200 mile zone and
new prohibition zone, Japan was allowed to catch a total of
42,500 metric tons or 32.8 million salmon in 1978, whichever
came first. The new salmon quota represented a drastic
31.5 percent cut from 1977 quota of 62,000 metric tons. Of
the total quota for 1978 catch 28,000 metric tons was allowed
in the international waters, outside the Japanese and U. S.
200-mile zone adjacent to the Soviet 200-mile zone. The
closed area for salmon fishing was bounded by Latitude 44°N,
Longitude l70 oE, and the Soviet and U.S. 200-mile zone
boundaries (see Fig. 12). The fishing season for 1978 was
set for a 4 month period from May 1 through August 1. This
agreement on salmon fishing expired on December 31, 1978.
67
Additionally, the Japanese government made a payment in goods
into a "fishery cooperation fund" which in 1978 totaled near
8.2 million dollars, which was 4.5 percent of the total catch
price. Consequently, Japanese salmon fishing vessels were
111
scrapped by about 30 percent (162 vessels) .
The reason that the Soviets accepted a total catch fee
instead of the projects of "Fishery Cooperation" was because
the Soviet Union must essentially guarantee a salmon quota
to Japan if it desired Japanese projects. However, there is
no such Soviet obligation by receiving a total catch fee and
it is still easy to decrease the catch quota bit by bit.
The Soviet Union plans to collect a 25 percent total catch
fee by the Japanese fishing vessels in its own 200-mile zone,
and therefore the total catch fee is likely to play a large
role in the Soviet's new fundamental fishery policy.
The fishery negotiations of 1979
In November, 1978, the Japanese-Soviet fishery negoti-
ations for the 1979 quotas for each other, were held in
Tokyo. And Japan proposed on November 24 that the Soviets
be allowed to catch 650,000 metric tons of fish the same as
the 1978 quota if they accepted Japan's demand of 900,000
metric tons of fish for the 1979 quota. But the Soviets
proposed that the Japanese be allowed to catch 650,000
metric tons of fish (a 25 percent decrease from its 1978
quota) in the Soviet zone under the condition of 650,000
metric tons for the Soviet 1979 quota in the Japanese zone. 11 2
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The Soviet Union again used its position of the "equivalent
principle" (the principle of equal allocation) throughout
the meeting, and also demanded the ban of the Japanese trawl-
ing in the Soviet zone (a 70 percent curtailment of Japanese
total trawl fishing vessels). Japan rejected it and sug-
gested the total ban of the Soviet trawl fishing in the Japan-
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ese zone. Consequently, the Soviet Union finally withdrew
its claim for the ban of the Japanese trawl fishing, and also
accepted to 750,000 metric tons of Japan's 1979 quota. There-
fore, Japan permitted only the Soviet sardine and mackerel
trawl fishing in the Japanese zone. On December 14, 1978,
Japan and the Soviet Union signed in Tokyo the Japanese-Soviet
Fishery Interim Agreement, and established 1979 catch alloca-
tions for each other. The agreement allowed Japan to catch
750,000 metric tons of fish in the Soviet zone, and the
Soviets to catch 650,000 metric tons of fish in the Japanese
zone.
Japanese officials reports emphasize that the signifi-
cance of 100,000 metric tons difference between the two allo-
cations. However, Japan has allowed the Soviets to maintain
their historic catch level in the Japanese catch, but re-
ceived in return only approximately 50 percent of its own
historic catch in the Soviet zone. 11 4 Finally, it is being
realized that the Soviet Union has steadily practiced its
. ". 1 .. 1 ,,115po11cy of equ1va ent pr1nc1p e.
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V. JAPAN'S NORTHERN FISHERY AND ITS FUTURE
Joint Venture
After the Soviet Union had maintained its position of
banning Japan's fishing in most areas in its 200-mile zone,
the Japanese fishing industry attempted to establish joint
ventures with the Soviet Union in these areas. The joint
ventures with the Soviet Union enable the Japanese fisher-
men to obtain access to their own historic fishing areas
claimed by the Soviet Union, and thereby continue their tra-
ditional fisheries, although at the additional cost of
fishing fees. The Soviet Union expected these proposals from
the Japanese side.
On April 26, 1978, the Soviet Ministry of Fisheries and
Japanese fishing companies reached an informal agreement on
five joint ventures: to catch tanner crab, hair crab, brown
King crab, and pink shrimp. The agreement specified that
25 percent of Japan's catch would be given to the Soviet Union
as a fishing fee, and that Japan would buy back this 25 per-
cent, and in addition, purchase the Soviet's catch. Also,
Japan would transfer their fisheries technologies to the
Soviet union. 11 6 The Japan side expected this joint operation
to begin in June 1978, however, no final agreement has been
signed. The reason the Kremlin did not approve the primary
agreement concerning the joint ventures, is probably related
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to the normalization of Japan-Communist China relations. And
on September 5, 1978, the Soviet Fisheries Minister Ishkov, told
a visiting Japanese Diet group that the five joint ventures
should be abandoned for this year because the 1978 fishing
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season was nearly over.
Certainly, the joint venture is one of the major solutions
to Japanese northern fishery restrictions in the Soviet 200-
mile zone. However, there are some basic problems related to
these joint ventures. The Soviet Union's concern regarding
the joint venture is mostly to master the Japanese fishing
operation technology rather than to make foreign currency.
There is no guarantee, therefore, that the joint venture will
secureJapan's fishing in the Soviet zone after they have
learned Japanese fishing operation technology. Also, the
Soviets proposed another joint venture of Alaska pollock;
however, the Japanese government did not approve it. 11 8 The
major species in Japan's allocation is Alaska pollock. It
realized that the increased harvest from a joint venture for
Alaska pollock would decrease Japan's Alaska pollock allow-
able catch. Therefore, various intentions of both sides are
involved in the Japanese-Soviet joint venture. The problem
of the Japanese-Soviet joint venture has just started, and
its future is not easy.
Future of Japanese-Soviet fishery negotiations
Tass Press reported on February 6, 1979, that Soviet
Fisheries Minister Alekandr Ishkov, who served in his post
for 30 years, was dismissed from the post by reason of ad-
vanced age. 1 1 9 The dismissal of Ishkov will have an important
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effect on the prospective Japanese-Soviet fishery negotiations
with many difficult problems. The next day, Japanese Ministry
of Agriculture and Forestry officials noted that upcoming
salmon fishery negotiations' outlook was not promising at all
because of the dismissal of Ishkov, who understood Japan's
position well.
Soviet new fisheries Minister Kmenshev in succession
to Ishkov stated on February 17, 1979 that the Soviet Union
was preparing to hold the Japanese-soviet salmon fishery ne-
gotiations in Moscow in March, and would propose the total
ban of salmon fishing in the northwest Pacific Ocean inc1ud-
ing the Japanese 200-mi1e zone.
The All-Japan Seaman's Union reported that 14,000 fish-
ermen and related workers lost their jobs in 1977. Of this
total 4,000 were linked directly to the reduced Pacific sa1-
mon quota resulting from the fishing agreement with the Soviet
union. 1 20 The Japanese government took the emergency loans
and compensation payments to aid unemployed fishermen for
two years after their standard 8 month unemployment insur-
ance ran out in August 1977. The Japanese government must
reconsider fundamentally not only the problem of unemployed
fishermen but also the Japanese fishery policy which relies
on the historical rights. The Soviet Union will attempt to
impose more restrictions on Japan's salmon fishing on the
international waters as a means of conservation. Unfortunately,
the Japanese Government has little political leverage to use
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in the fishery negotiations and the prospect for Japanese-
Soviet fishery negotiations in the 1980s will likely involve
more political issues between Japan and the Soviet Union.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
After the establishment of the Soviet 200-mile fish-
ery zone, Japan made the Soviet Union recognize, through
the fishery negotiations in 1977, that territorial questions
would be separated from fishing rights questions. However,
at present, the position of the Soviet Union is even more
strongly held that there is no territorial problem with Japan,
and therefore they will consider no further negotiations.
The Soviet interests in the islands has traditionally been
tied to military access to the Pacific Ocean. But recently,
their development of and reliance on fishing and the general
•
world-wide acceptance of the 200-mile economic zone, has in-
creased their desire for this area. But Japan is also in
need of fishing resources, and the continuing emotional feel-
ing that the Soviets are illegally occupying the northern
territories keeps the issue alive in Japan. Japan will un-
doubtedly maintain its continuous record of protest against
Soviet retention of the northern territories. It remains
likely that Japan will be allowed some degree of fishing
operation in Soviet controlled waters since the Soviet Union
still needs some concessions from Japan including fishing
rights in Japan's waters. Also, the Soviet Union is expect-
ing joint fishing ventures with Japan in the Soviet 200-mile
zone. However, the joint fishing venture can only be
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supplementary to Japanese fisheries, at best, and Japan ques-
tions what will be the Soviet Union's policy after it has
mastered Japan's fishing technology. In future Japanese-
Soviet fishery negotiations, the Soviet Union will probably
use political maneuvers and attempt to force Japan to choose
between continued fish allocations and the northern territor-
ies. But at this time there appears little doubt that Japan
will continue to claim its right in the northern territories
even if there is no fishing quota allowed in the Soviet 200-
mile zone. Thus, the potential for Japan to gain control of
the northern territories remains doubtful, but the future
Japanese-Soviet fishery negotiations will inevitably involve
the complicated problems of the northern territories and
joint venture problems.
( ( (
TABLE 1. Japan's 1978 quotas in seven fishing areas within the Soviet 200-mile zone (in metric tons)
Species
Pollock
Squid
Sand lance
Flounders
Ocean perch
Cod
Wachna cod
Atka mackerel
Shrimp
Saury
Octopus
Other fish
Red tanner crab
Crabs
Snail
Tuna and
skipjack
Sharks4
1
21,800
2
199,900
38,200
21,9000
21,800
31,000
13,900
2,400
66,600
1,600
67,700
6,400
1,200
3
2,700
2,000
1,900
200
4,900
500
1,000
800
1,500
AREAS1
4
63,500
1,000
200
2,400
800
5
800
6
65,500
2,000
1,000
100
1,500
300
1,000
1,500
2,500
700 3
7
76,900
104,200
1,700
5,500
8,700
100
6,800
500
900
7,700
2,300
Total
quota
1978 5
345,000
146,400
65,200
30,300
22,000
44,700
15,500
11,000
500
68,600
3,500
80,800
2,300
4,100
2,500
6,400
1,200
Actual
catch
1976
1,073,000
111,000
42,000
68,000
4,000
38,000
13,000
43,000
7,000
39,000
n.a.
69,000
5,000
16,000
4,000
6,000
n.a.
:1,.978
quota
as % of
1976
catch
32
132
154
45
550
118
119
26
7
176
117
46
26
62
107
1,800 472,600 15,500 67,900 800 76,100 215,300 850,000 1,538,000 55
I Se e Table 2 and Figure 1; 2Shucked; 3Wi t h shell; 4Excluding dogfish shark; 5Salmon and herring catches
Source: Japanese Fisheries Agency,Tokyo. prohibited after 1977.
.....
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Table 2. Species allocated to Japanese fishermen in
seven fishing areas within the Soviet 200-
mile zone, 1978.
Fishing Area
1. Northern Okhotsk Sea
57°30'N and l46°l0'E-154°0'E
2. Ku~ils, Pacific side West of
l55°N including the four dis-
puted islands
3. Kuriles, Okhatsk side South of
50 0N including the off the
coasts
4. Nijo-Iwa, northern
Hokkaido
5. Okhotsk Sea
54°-56°N and l47°E-153°E
6. East Sakhalin
45°40'-50 oN and a line connect-
ing l46°N, Cape Aniwa and Cape
Kita Shiretoko. 45°40'N-
49°0'N and a line connecting
l46°l0'N-Cape Aniwa and Cape
Kita Shiretoko
7. Japan Sea, Primorskaya South of
a line connecting Cape Berkina
and a point 12 miles south of
Cape Notoro on West Sakhalin,
and East of l35°E, West of l35°E
Source: Japanese Fisheries AGency, Tokyo.
Species
snail
Flounderr ocean
perch, Wachna cod,
cod, saury, octapus,
squid, pollock, etc.
Cod, pollock,
flounders, squid,
saury, and octopus
Sand lance and
hair crab
Brown king crab
Tanner crab and
snail
Other fish,
pollock, etc.
Other fish, pollock,
squid, flounders,
cod, atka mackerel
Red tanner crab and
squid
( (
TABLE 3. Soviet1s 1978 quotas within the Japanese 200-mile ZOne (in metric tons)
(
Okhotsk Pacific Total Quota Actual 1978 Quota
Species Sea Ocean Quota Jul. Dec. Catch as % of1978 1977 1976 1976 Catch
Sardine and mackerel - 318,000 318,000 200,000 287,000 111
Pollock - 80,000 80,000 30,000 174,000 46
Itohikidara (Remonema) - 138,000 138,000 58,000 138,000 100
Saury - 20,000 20,000 10,000 n.a.
Sand Lance 30,000 - 30,000 4,500 30,000 100
Other 3,000 61,000 64,000 32,500 36,000 178
-- --
Total 33,000 617,000 650,000 335,000 665,000 98
Source: Japanese Fisheries Agency, Tokyo.
-..J
-..J
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TABLE 4. U.S.S.R. Catch of Salmon (metric tons)
Year Harvest Year Harvest Year Harvest
1952 116,300 1961 82,600 1971 84,800
1953 188,700 1962 64,200 1972 35,100
1954 110,900 1963 84,100 1973 76,700
1955 164,600 1964 49,700 1974 48,000
1965 93,200 1975 102,900
1956 166,600 1966 62,000 1976 70,200
1957 150,800 1967 86,000 1977 139,300
1958 76,000 1968 41,200
1959 94,000 1969 80,600
1960 73,800 1970 44,200
Source: The U.S.S.R. Research Institute of Marine Fisheries
and Oceanography
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TABLE 5. Japanese catch of salmon in the high seas
A ZONE
YEAR TOTAL HARVEST HARVEST ALLOCATION
1952 3,800
1953 28,300
1954 76,300
1955 175,500 65~00011956 151,300
1957* 181,500 121,000 120,000
1958 196,600 110,100 110,000 21959 179,200 85,000 85,000
1960 146,800 66,600 67,500
1961 156,400 65,000 65,000
YEAR
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977**
1978
TOTAL HARVEST
(A & B Zones)
95,600
120,300
100,400
115,000
96,000
100,200
88,800
95,200
82,000
84,200
89,800
93,200
85,300
87,600
82,800
62,600
no data
ALLOCATION
(A & B Zones)
115,000
120,000
110,000
115,000
96,000
108,000
93,000
105,000
90,000
95,000
87,000
91,000
83,000
87,000
80,000 362,000
45,500
* Japanese-Soviet Fishery negotiations begun and held annually
from 1957 to 1976.
**Five Year Japanese-Soviet Bilateral Fishery Cooperation
Agreement. . ..
1. Within Bulganin Line; 2. The ban of salmon catchlng wlthln
the Sea of Okhotsk; 3. The ban of salmon catching within the
Soviet's 200 mile zone.
Source: Japanese Fishery Agency.
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1. For a detail on MacArthur Line, see The Japan Year Book
1949-1952, Tokyo, 1952, pp 435-448.
2. After the settlement of the Sakhalin-Kuril Islands Ex-
change Treaty (August 22, 1875).
3. After the settlement of the Portsmouth Conference
(August, 1905).
4. These nations are The Soviet Union, South Korea, Communist
China, Canada, The United States, and so on.
5. Ope Cit. The Japan Year Book 1949-1952, pp. 482-498.
6.
7.
8.
9 .
For a detail, see Herrington, w.c. Problems Affecting
North Pacific Fisheries. 26 U.S. Department of State
Bulletin 1952, pp 340-342. On the other hand, on January
18, 1952, three months before Japanese sovereignty was
restored by the San Francisco Peace Treaty, South Korean
President Syngman Rhee issued a Proclamation of Sovereignty
over the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea. He delineated
his country's claim by the so-called "Rhee Line" which·
encompassed an area ranging from 20 to 200 miles offshore,
where the Japanese fisheries were not allowed to operate.
By the end of 1964 (the year pr-ec'ed i nq the settlement of
the dispute with South Korea), 3,929 Japanese fishermen
and 327 fishing vessels were seized by South Korea and
they returned only 141 fishing vessels.
Aoki, Hiroshi. Kikinitatsu Hokuyo Gyogyo (Tokyo, 1977),
p. 114. Japanese Cabinet Research Office, Nisso Kosho to
Suisankai no Ugoki. Chosa geppo, June 1957, p. 34. This
may be compared with the Japanese salmon catch of
243,400 metric tons for 1938 and 301,200 metric tons for
1939.
Miyajima, Hishiro. 200 Kairi to Enyougyogyo, Tohokukeizai
Review, No. 63, August 1977, p. 84.
The mother ship type of fishery is that one of typical
methods of fisheries which consists of one or two huge
mother ships accompanied by about 50 small catcher boats.
The fish caught by those small catcher boats are brought
to the mother ships where they are processed to final
commercial products.
10. Ope Cit. Nisso kosho to Suisankai no Ugoki.
11. For details, see Hokuyo (The North Sea) Hokkaido Shin-
bunsha Sapporo, 1973. Also, see Sake Masu Nagashiami
Gyogyo Shi All Japan Salmon Fisherman Association, Tokyo,
1966.
8f
12. Pravda, March 21, 1956, p. 30.
13. Ope Cit. Kiki nitatsu Hakuyo Gyogyo, p. 122.
14.
15.
16.
17.
Asahi Evening News, April 9, 1956. Ope Cit. Nisso Kosho
to suisankai no Ugoki, p. 42, pp. 47-49.
There is no information of Japan's salmon harvest in
1955 as same area as area within the Bulganin Line in
1956.
They were transferred to the so~th Pacific Ocean for
tuna fishery and to the Antarct~c Ocean for whale
fishery.
By the end of 1954, 303 Japanese fishing vessels were
seized by the Soviets. Although some of the vessels and
crew had been returned to Japan, forty-six crew members
remained captive in the Soviet Union and the whereabouts
of 232 of the vessels were unknown.
18. The Asahi, June 1, 1955. Yomiuri, June 1, 1955. For a
detailed review of the 1955-1956 peace treaty negotia-
tions, see Hellman, Donald C., Japanese Foreign Policy
and Domestic Politics (Barkeley~ 1969) . Also, see
Matsumoto Shunichi Moscow ni Kakeru Niji (Tokyo, 1966).
19. Ibid. Moscow in Kakeru Niji, pp. 99-101.
20. Sankei Shinbun, May 10, 1956. The Asahi, May 14-15, 1956.
21. The Asahi, January 26, 1956; August 28, 1956.
22. The Asahi, September 7, 1956. Mainichi Daily News,
September 8, 1956; September 20, 1956.
23. The Asahi News, Apri16, 1957. Soviet Nenpo (Tokyo
19 58), pp . 37 5- 376 .
24.
25.
26.
The meetings actually lasted anywhere ·from 28 days in
1969 to 122 days in 1959. See Chosa geppo, June 1966,
p. 37. Also, see Soren Kanren JUyo jiko nenshi (Tokyo)
1967-1977.. . .
Yomiuri, April 21-22,1958. Mainichi Daily News, April
21, 1958. Ope Cit. Kikinitatsu Hokuyo Gyogyo,
pp. 137-138.
Ope Cit. Soviet Nen¥po (Tokyo) 1959, p. 367. Nihon Soren
Koryu Nenshi (Tokyo~ 1960, pp. 229-232; 1961,pp. 261-
264; 1962, pp 253-257;1963, pp 289-294.
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27. Izvestia, October 19, 1960; Pravda, January 1960, and
June 17, 1960. The Asahi, January 27, 1960; February 2,
1960; April 6, 1960; May 19, 1960.
28. It must be remembered that Japanese closed-door policy
(1588-1868) did not have many experiences to negotiate
with other nations.
29. The Asahi, May 22, 1961.
30. Izvestia, December 1960, pp 22-23; -Pravda, March 18,
1959, p. 24.
31. Oriental Economist, May 1962, p. 259; June 1962, p. 339;
The Asahi, May 13, 1962; June 1, 1962.
32. The safe fishing and the northern territories issues be
separated and that safe fishing be guaranteed (no seizure)
around the northern territories.
33. Tokyo Shinbun, June 30, 1966.
34. The Asahi, April 21, 1969.
35. Japan Times, May 1, 1971; The Asahi, May 2, 1971.
36. American Journal of International Law, Vol 52, 1958,
pp 858-862; The Asahi, April 27, 1968.
37. Suisan Keizai Shinbun, AprilS, 19691 April 8, 1969;
April 16, 1975. For details, see Japan Fishery Agency,
Nisso Kani Kyotei Kaitei Kosho, Tokyo, 1970.
38. For details, see Japan Fishery Agency, The White Paper,
Tokyo, 1976; The Asahi, April 18, 1975.
39. For details, see Mainichi Daily News Press, The Fish War,
Tokyo, 1976.
40. The Asahi, September 11-12, 1976; Japan Times,
September 17, 1976.
41. Washington Fost, September 10, 1976; September 15, 1976;
September 16, 1976; The Asahi, September 8, 10, 23, 1976;
Mainichi Daily News, September 14, 1976; Japan Times,
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42. Source: Japanese Maritime Safety Agency (March 15, 1978).
43. Yomiuri, September 13, 1976.
44. Tokyo Shinbun, June 30, 1966; Japan Times, July 23, 1967;
July 16, 1970; Asahi Evening News, May 17, 1976.
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45. Shien Yoshida, Hoppo Ryodo (The Northern Territories),
(Tokyo, 1978), pp 67-68.
46. John J. Stephan, The Kuril Islands (Oxford, 1974),
pp 165-166.
47. The Kurils' absorption into the U.S.S.R. took place in
several stages. On September 20, 1945, the arc was de-
clared to be Soviet territory. On February 2, 1946, it
was designated a part of the Khabarovsk region. On Jan-
uary 2, 1977, Moscow created a new administrative entry
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25, 1947, when the Soviet constitution was amended to
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Soviet Federated Socialist Republic
48. New York Times, January 24, 1947, December 23, 1949.
49. During the Yalta meeting, U.S. President Roosevelt re-
plied that he foresaw no difficulty in the transfer to
Russia of the Kuril Islands and half of Sakhalin but
President Roosevelt operated on the mistaken assumption
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APPENDIX A
TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS
This Appendix contains extracts of treaties and agree-
ments that concern the Kuril Islands. For complete texts,
consult the sources cited below each extract.
I. Treaty of Shimoda (7 February 1855)
ARTICLE II
Henceforth the boundaries between Russia and Japan
will pass between the islands Etorofu and Uruppu. The whole
island of Etorofu belongs to Japan and the whole island of
Uruppu and the other Kuril Islands to the north constitute
possessions of Russia. As regards the island Karafuto
(Sakhalin), it remains unpartitioned between Russia and Japan,
as has been the case up to this time.
Japan, Foreign Office. Treaties and Conventions between
the Empire of Japan and other Powers together with Universal
Conventions, Regulations and Communications since March 1854
(rev. ed. Tokyo, 1884), p. 585.
2. Treaty of St. petersburg (7 May 1875)
ARTICLE II
In exchange for the cession to Russia of the rights on
the island of Sakhalin, stipulated in the first article, His
Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, for Himself and His
Descendants, cedes to His Majesty the Emperor of Japan the
group of the Kuril islands which he possesses at present,
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together with all the rights of sovereignty appertaining to
this possession, so that henceforth the said group of Kuril
islands shall belong to the Empire of Japan. This group com-
prises the following eighteen islands: (1) Shimushu, (2)
Araido, (3) Paramushiru, (4) Makanrushi, (5) Onekotan, (6)
Harumukotan, (7) Ekaruma, (8) Shasukotan, (9) Mushiru, (10)
Raikoke, (11) Matsuwa, (12) Rashuwa, (13) Suride and
Ushishiru, (14) Ketoi, (15) Shimushiru, (16) Buroton, (17)
Cherupoi and Buratto Cherupoefu [Chirihoi or Chiornye Bratia],
(18) Uruppu, so that the boundary between the Empires of
Russia and Japan in these areas shall pass through the Strait
between Cape Lopatka of ,the Peninsula of Kamchatka and the
island of Shimushu.
ARTICLE V
The residents of the territories ceded from one and
the other, the Russian and Japanese subjects, may retain
their nationality and return to their respective countries;
but if they prefer to remain in the ceded territories, they
shall be allowed to stay and shall receive protection in the
full exercise of their industry, their right of property and
religion, on the same footing as the nationals, provided
that they submit to the laws and jurisdiction of the country
to which the possession of the respective territories passes.
Japan, Foreign Office. Dai Nihon gaiko bunsho, VIII
(Tokyo, 1940), 216-26. George A. Lensen, The Russian Push
Toward Japan (princeton, 1959), pp. 501-4.
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III. Supplementary Article to the Sakhalin-Kuril Islands
Exchange: the Treaty of Tokyo (22 Aug. 1875)
a. The inhabitants of the territories ceded from one and
the other, the Russian and Japanese subjects, who desire to
remain domiciled in the localities which they occupy at pre-
sent, shall be maintained in the full exercise of their in-
dustries. They shall retain the right of fishery and hunting
within the limits belonging to them and shall be exempted
from any tax on their respective industries for the rest of
their life.
b. The Japanese subjects who will remain on the island of
Sakhalin and the Russian subjects who will remain on the
Kuril Islands shall be maintained and protected in the full
exercise of their present right of property. Certificates
shall be given to them, confirming their right of usufruct
and ownership of the immovable properties in their possession.
c. A full and perfect freedom of religion is accorded to
the Japanese subjects residing on the island of Sakhalin, as
well as to the Russian subjects residing on the Kuril Islands.
The Churches, temples and cemeteries shall be respected.
d. The aborigines of Sakhalin as well as of the Kurils
shall not enjoy the right to remain domiciled in the locali-
ties which they now occupy and at the same time to keep their
present subjection. If they desire to remain subject to their
present Government, they must leave their domicile and go to
the territory belonging to their Sovereign; if they wish to
remain domiciled in the localities which they occupy at pre-
sent, they must change their subjection. They shall be given,
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however, a period of three years from the date of their noti-
fication of this supplementary treaty for making a decision
on thismatter. During these three years, they shall maintain
the right of fishery, hunting and any other industry which
they have been engaged in until this day, on the same condi-
tions as regards privileges and obligations which have ex-
isted for them until now on the island of Sakhalin and on the
Kuril islands, but during all this time they shall be subject
to local laws and regulations. At the expiration of this
term, the aborigines who are domiciled in the territories
reciprocally ceded, shall become the subjects of the Government,
to which the ownership of the territory will pass.
e. A full and perfect freedom of religion is accorded to
all the aborigines of the island of Sakhalin and of the Kuril
Islands. The temples and the cemeteries shall be respected.
Japan, Foreign Office. Dai Nihon gaiko bunsho, VIII
(Tokyo, 1940), 259-62. Lensen, The Russian Push toward Japan,
pp. 505-6.
IV. Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact (13 Apr. 1941)
ARTICLE I
Both cont~act±ng parties undertake to maintain peaceful
and friendly relations between themselves and mutually to
respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the
other contracting party.
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ARTICLE II
Should one of the contracting parties become the object
of hostilities on the part of one or several third Powers,
the other contracting party will observe neutrality through-
out the entire duration of the conflict.
ARTICLE III
The present pact comes into force from the day of its rat-
ification by both contracting parties and shall remain valid
for five years. Should neither of the contracting parties
denounce the pact one year before expiration of the term, it
will be considered automatically prolonged for the following
five years.
Japan, Foreign Office. Nihon gaiko nenpyo narabi shuyo
bunsho, II (Tokyo, 1965), 491-2. Jane Degras, ed., Soviet
Documents on Foreign policy, III (London, 1953), 486-7.
George A. Lensen, The Strange Neutrality (Tallahassee, 1972),
pp. 277-8.
v. The Cairo Declaration (27 Nov. 1943)
The three great Allies are fighting this war to restrain
and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for
themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It
is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all islands
in the Pacific which she has seized and occupied since the be-
ginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the
territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria,
Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic
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of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other terri-
tories which she has taken by violence and greed.
United States, De~artment of State. Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1 43, the Conferences of Cairo and Teheran
(Washington, 1961), pp. 448-9.
VI. Agreement Regarding Entry of the~S-oviet Union into the
War Against Japan: Yalta Agreement (11 Feb.1945) •
The leaders of three Great Powers--The Soviet Union, United
States of America and Great Britain--have agreed that in two
or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in
Europe has terminated the Soviet Union shall enter into the
war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:
2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous
attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz:
a. The southern part of Sakhalin as well as all islands
adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet
Union.
3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet
Union.
The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these
claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled
after Japan has been defeated.
United States, Department of State. Foreign Relations of
the United States, theConferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945
(Washington, 1955), p. 984.
VII. The Potsdam Declarations: Signed by China, Great Britain
the United States (26 July 1945), and by the Soviet Union
(9 Aug. 1945) i
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8. The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out
and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of
Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as
we determine.
United States, Department of State. Foreign Relations of
the United States, Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), 1945,
II (Washington, 1960), 1281.
VIII. Treaty of Peace with Japan: the San Francisco Treaty
(8 Sept. 1951).
ARTICLE II
c. Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kuri1e
Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands ad-
jacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a conse-
quence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of 5 Sept. 1905.
United States, Department of State, united States Treaties
and Other International Agreements, 1952, III, Part 3
(Washington, 1952), 3172.
IX. United States Department of State Aide-Memoire on Yalta
Kuri1s (7 Sept. 1956).
Pursuant to the request made by the Japanese Foreign
Minister, Mr. Shigemitsu, in the course of recent conversations
in London with theSecretary of State, Mr. Dulles, the Depart-
ment of State has reviewed the problems presented in the course
of the current negotiations for a Treaty of Peace between the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan, with particular
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reference to the interest of the United States as a signatory
of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and on the basis of such
review makes the following observations:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
With respect t~ the territorial question, as the Japanese
Government has been previously informed, the United States
regards the so-called Yalta Agreement as simply a statement
of common purposes by the then heads of the participating
powers, and not as a final determination by those powers or
of any legal effect in transferring territories. The San
Francisco Peace Treaty (which conferred no rights upon the
Soviet Union because it refused to sign) did not determine
the sovereignty of the territories renounced by Japan, leav-
ing the question, as was stated by the Delegate of the
United States at San Francisco, to "Lrrcezna tdone.L solvents
other than this Treaty."
It is the considered opinion of the United states that by
virtue of the San Francisco Peace Treaty Japan does not
have the right to transfer sovereignty over the territories
renounced by it therein. In the opinion of the United
States, the signatories of the San Francisco Treaty would not
be bound to accept any action of this character and would pre-
sumably reserve all their rights thereunder.
The United States has reached the conclusion after care-
ful examination of the historical facts that the islands of
Etorofu and Kunashiri (along with the Habomai Islands and
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Shikotan which are a part of Hokkaido) have always been part
of Japan proper and should in justice be acknowledged as
under Japanese sovereignty. The United States would regard
Soviet agreement to this effect as a positive contribution
to the reduction of tension in the Far East.
Nanpo Doho Engokai, ed., Hoppo ryodo no chili (Tokyo,
1962), pp. 599-600.
X. Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration (19 Oct. 1956)
9. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan
agree to continue, after the restorati0.n of normal diplo-
matic relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics and Japan, negotiations for the conclusion of a
Peace Treaty.
In this connexion, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
desiring to meet the wishes of Japan and taking into consid-
eration the interests of the Japanese State, agrees to trans-
fer to Japan the Habomai Islands and the island of Shikoton
[sic], the actual transfer of these islands to Japan to take
place after the conclusion of a Peace Treaty between the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan.
united Nations. Treaty Series, vol. 263 (1957), 116.
XI. The Japanese-Soviet Fishery Interim Agreement, (27 May 1977).
ARTICLE VIII
No provisions of this agreement can be construed as to
prejudice the positions or views of either Government, either
102
in regard to the various problems of the Law of the Sea which
is being studied at the Third Session of the United Nations
Law of the Sea Conference or in regard to various problems in
mutual relations.
Japan, Foreign Office. Japanese-Soviet Bilateral Interim
Fishery AGreement, pp. 29-35, July 1977.
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APPENDIX B
CHRONOLOGY OF JAPANESE-SOVIET FISHERY RELATIONS
1945
August -
September -
September -
1946
April -
1951
September -
September -
November -
1952
April -
May -
1953
May -
Japan accepted the Potsdam Declarations
MacArthur Line established
Soviet Union declared that the Kurils and
southern Sakhalin were Soviet territory.
First Japanese fishing vessel seized by the
Soviets
San Francisco Peace Conference opened
Soviet Union refused to sign peace treaty
with Japan
North Pacific Fishery Convention held in Tokyo
San Francisco Peace Treaty came into force, and
MacArthur Line was abolished
Japan-U.S. Security Pact came into force
Japanese Northern Pacific Fishery resumed
(salmon mother ship type fishery; three mother
ship with 50 fishing vessels)
Japanese government authorized 191 drift gill
net salmon fishing vessels in the North Pacific.
1954
May -
1955
June -
1956
January -
March -
March -
May -
July -
October -
December -
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1897 drift gill net salmon fishing vessels
operating in North Pacific area south of
Lati tude 48 oN
First Japanese-Soviet Peace Treaty negotia-
tions held in London.
Japanese government permitted 19 mother
ships and 557 salmon fishing vessels in
North Pacific including the Sea of Okhotsk
Peace Treaty negotations broken off
Soviet Union establish the Bulganin Line
Japanese-Soviet Tentative Fishery Treaty
signed
- Japan allowed to catch 65,000 metric
tons of salmon within the Bulganin Line
Peace Treaty negotiations resumed in Moscow
Japanese-Soviet Joint Declaration signed in
Moscow.
- Agreed that with the settling of a peace
treaty, the Soviets would return the Habomai
Islands group and Shikotan Island to Japan
High Seas Fisheries Convention was ratified
(ten year term)
1957
February-April
1958
January-April
1959
January-May
1960
January -
February-May
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First Japanese-Soviet Fishery negotiations
held in Tokyo.
- Japan's salmon allocation 120,000 metric
tons in the areas north of Latitude 45°N
(A zone)
Second Japanese-Soviet Fishery negotiations
held in Moscow.
- Japan's salmon allocation 110,000 metric
tons in A zone, and agreement to closed
salmon fishing in the Sea of Okhotsk,
starting 1959.
Third Japanese-Soviet Fishery negotiations
held in Tokyo.
- Japan's salmon allocation 85,000 metric
tons
Soviet Union criticized the extension of
the Japan-U.S. Security Pact in 1960.
Fourth Japanese-Soviet Fishery negotiations
held in Moscow.
- Japan's salmon allocation, 67,500 metric
tons in A zone.
1961
January -
February-May -
November -
1962
February-May -
1963
March - April -
June -
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Soviet Union criticized overharvesting of
salmon by Japan in areas south of
Latitude 48°N
Fifth Japanese-Soviet Fishery negotiations
held in Tokyo.
- Japan's salmon allocation, 60,000 metric
tons in A zone.
Soviet Vice Minister Mikayan visited Japan
in connection with the industrial fair and
demanded the application of regulations for
the northern convention to salmon fishing
throughout the Pacific.
sixth Japanese-Soviet Fishery negotiations
held in Moscow.
- Japan accepted Soviet regulation extend-
ing to the South.
- Japan's salmon allocation: A zone, 55,000
metric tons; B zone, 60,000 metric tons
Seventh Japanese-Soviet Fishery negotiations
held in Tokyo.
- Japan's salmon allocation:
A zone, 57,000 metric tons
B zone, 63,000 metric tons
Tangle collecting agreement signed in
Moscow (the Habomai Islands group) .
1964
March-April -
1965
March-April -
May -
June -
1966
March-April
June -
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Eighth Japanese-Soviet Fishery negotiations
held in Moscow.
- Japan's salmon allocation:
A zone, 55,000 metric tons
B zone, 55,000 metric tons
Ninth Japanese-Soviet Fishery negotations
held in Tokyo.
- Japan's salmon allocation:
A zone, 55,000 metric tons
B zone, 60,000 metric tons
Tangle collecting agreement extended two
years
Japanese Minister of Agriculture and
Forestry Akagi proposed the safety operation
plan to the Soviet Union
Tenth Japanese-Soviet Fishery negotiations
held in Moscow
- Japan's salmon allocation:
A zone, 48,000 metric tons
B zone, 48,000 metric tons
The Soviet Minister of Fisheries Ishkov
visited Japan and agreed that the High Seas
Fisheries Convention be extended every year.
1967
March-April -
May -
1968
March -
March -
April -
1969
March -
March-April -
April -
September -
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Eleventh Japanese-Soviet Fishery negotia-
tions held in Tokyo
- Japan's salmon allocation, 108,000 metric
tons
Tangle collecting agreement extended 2 years
Twelfth Japanese-Soviet Fishery negotiations
held in Moscow.
- Japan's salmon allocation, 93,000 metric
tons
Japanese government protested the Soviet's
including crabs as a creature of the shelf
Japanese-Soviet crab fishing negotiations
signed and separated from the main negoti-
ations to be held every March in Moscow
after 1969.
Soviet Union announced the ban of roe-
bearing herring catch in the Sea of Okhotsk.
Thirteenth Japanese-Soviet Fishery negotia-
tions held in Tokyo.
- Japan's salmon allocation, 105,000 metric
tons
Tangle collecting agreement extended 2 years.
Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Aichi
visited Moscow and proposed the safety
operation plan.
1970
March-April -
1971
March-May -
June -
1972
January -
March-April
1973
March-April -
October -
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Fourteenth Japanese-Soviet Fishery negotia-
tions held in Moscow.
- Japan's salmon allocation, 90,000 metric
tons
Fifteenth Japanese-Soviet Fishery negotiations
held in Tokyo.
- Japan's salmon allocation, 95,000 metric
tons.
- Japan agreed to stop the catching of
roe-bearing herring in the Sea of Okhotsk
Agreement to tangle collecting agreement
every year after 1971.
Japan initiated normalization of relations
with the People's Republic of China
Sixteenth Japanese-Soviet Fishery negotia-
tions held in Moscow.
- Japan's salmon allocation, 87,000 metric
tons
Seventeenth Japanese-Soviet Fishery negoti-
ations held in Tokyo.
- Japan's salmon allocation, 91,000 metric
tons
Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka visited
Moscow. Announced the Joint Communique
concerning the northern territories.
1974
March-April
1975
March-April
April -
1976
February -
March-May
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Eighteenth Japanese-Soviet Fishery Negoti-
ations held in Tokyo.
- Japan's salmon allocation, 83,000 metric
tons.
Nineteenth Japanese-Soviet Fishery Negoti-
ations held in Moscow.
- Japan's salmon allocation, 87,000 metric
tons.
Japan accepted that all areas west of
Kamchtka were closed to crab fishing re-
sulting in the destruction of the Japanese
mother ship crab fishery.
Soviet Secretary-General Brezhnev at the
Twenty-fifth Party Congress, denounced
Japan's northern territories claims as
"unwarranted and illegitimate."
Twentieth Japanese-Soviet Fishery Negoti-
ations held in Moscow.
- Japan's salmon allocation, 80,000 metric
tons.
- Japan accepted a cutback to 50% Of Japan's
actual catch in the Sea of Ohkotsk in
1975.
September -
December -
1977
February
March -
April -
May -
May-August -
III
- The MIG-25 interceptor flew into Japan.
- Foreign Minister Miyazawa inspected the
northern territories.
- The Soviet Union declared the establish-
ment of 200 mile fishery zone and drew
the Soviet border line within the northern
territories (enforcement on March 1, 1977).
Suzuki-Ishikov talks concerning future
fishery negotiations.
- Japan declared its own 200 mile fishery
zone within the northern territories.
- Japanese Chief Cabinet Sonoda visited
Moscow. Soviet Union denounced the
High Seas Fisheries Convention.
- Japanese 200 mile fishery zone and 12 mile
territorial. waters came into force.
- Japanese Minister of Agriculture and Forestry
visited Moscow for third round of fishery
negotiations.
- The Japanese-Soviet Fishery Interim Agree-
ment for 1977 was signed in Moscow. Japan
accepted Soviet's 200 mile zone within the
northern territories.
- Japan's total allocation, 45,500 metric tons
in the Soviet 200 mile zone (June to December)
May-August -
(cont.)
November-
December
1978
February -
April -
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- Soviet's total allocation, 33,500 metric
tons in Japan's 200 mile zone (July to
December) .
- Japan accepted total ban of herring fish-
ing and salmon fishing in the Soviet's
200 mile zone.
- Japanese-Soviet fishery negotiation held
in Moscow.
- Japanese-Soviet Fishery Interim Agreement
for 1978 signed in Moscow.
- Japan total allocation, 850,000 metric
tons in the Soviet's zone.
- Soviet's total allocation, 650,000 metric
tons in Japan's zone.
- Japan accepted to extend the ban of
salmon fishing zone from Longitude 175°W
to Longitude 175°E in the new North
Pacific Fishery Convention.
-The Soviet Union proposed the total ban
of salmon fishery on the high seas.
- Japanese-Soviet salmon fishery negotiations
held in Moscow.
- Five Year Japanese-Soviet Bilateral Fishery
Cooperation Agreement for 1978 signed in
Moscow.
- Japan's salmon allocation, 42,500 metric
tons or 32.8 million salmon (whichever
April -
June -
August -
September -
November -
1979
February -
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came first). 8.2 million dollars for
fishing fee to the Soviet Union.
Soviet Unionand Japanese fishing companies
reached non-official agreements of five
joint ventures.
- Japanese government approved five joint
ventures.
- Japan and the people's Republic of China
signed the Japanese-people's Republic of
China Peace Treaty.
- Soviet Minister of Fisheries Ishkov told a
visiting Japanese Diet group that the five
joint ventures should be abandoned in 1978.
- Japanese-Soviet Fishery negotiations held
in Tokyo.
- Japanese-Soviet Fishery Interim Agreement
for 1979 signed. Japan's total allocation
in the Soviet zone, 750,000 metric tons.
- Soviet's total allocation in Japan's zone,
650,000 metric tons.
- Soviet Minister of Fisheries Ishkov dis-
missed from the post by reason of advanced
age.
